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INTRODUCTION 
During the 1980s, artificial intelligence research 
started to undergo a quiet, but important shift in 
focus from research in computer science to research in 
the human sciences and humanities. Though in the past, 
artificial intelligence has primarily been researched 
by computer scientists, the need for input from the 
human sciences has invited a great amount of cross-
disciplinary work by members of many different 
callings. Rarely do people start out in the field of 
artificial intelligence; rather, the dream of building 
an intelligent machine infects them as they see the 
parallels between their work and the projects being 
undertaken in artificial intelligence. Because 
artificial intelligence is, in essence, studying the 
qualities of humanness, few disciplines can avoid 
somehow being tied in. 
Whereas this multi-disciplinary effort has its 
appeal due to the amount of interest and work it 
stimulates, it also causes problems for the traditional 
paradigm developed and held by the discipline of 
artificial intelligence. The difficulties arise as 
scholars and experts from other disciplines recognize 
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similarities between their work and artificial 
intelligence but also notice the simple, fault-ridden 
assumptions traditionally held by artificial 
intelligence about human behavior and thought. Many 
researchers have brought their expert knowledge from 
other fields to artificial intelligence only to find 
that researchers in artificial intelligence prefer to 
operate on simplistic synthetic theories developed 
within the discipline. George Reeke and Gerald 
Edelman, two prominent neurobiologists, probably put it 
best with their assessment of artificial intelligence's 
work with psychology and the neurosciences: 
Artificial intelligence is a science that finds 
itself in somewhat the same epistemological 
position as Aristotleian dentistry. Aristotle 
stated that women have fewer teeth than men and 
attributed this characteristic to women's supposed 
lesser need, men being stronger and more choleric, 
but he never bothered to look in Mrs. Aristotle's 
mouth to verify his theory. Similarly, AI has 
developed as an almost entirely synthetic 
enterprise, quite isolated from the complementary, 
analytic study of the biology of natural 
intelligence represented by psychology and the 
neurosciences (Reeke and Edelman 1988). 
Reeke and Edelman's conclusion is one similar to that 
made by numerous other researchers who have tried to 
provide guidance for artificial intelligence. Often, 
after spending time trying to help research, these 
scholars and experts walk away disillusioned by the 
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tenacious desire of artificial intelligence researchers 
to cling to inadequate synthetic theories. 
Nowhere is this problem of keeping deficient 
theories more evidenced than in artificial 
intelligence's research into natural language. Major 
linguistic researchers like John Searle and Noam 
Chomsky look on in disbelief at some of the erroneous 
assumptions held in artificial intelligence about 
natural language. Once in a while they might even 
point out the problems with the synthetic theories. 
But instead of seriously considering the criticisms of 
experts from other fields, artificial intelligence 
researchers all too often end up concluding that those 
experts must be wrong or that the points brought up are 
too sophisticated for current research. What is often 
n2t realized in their defenses is that these experts 
from other fields are making their criticisms on an 
essentially fundamental level that ~ very relevant to 
current research. 
Researchers from the human sciences and humanities 
often find, as Reeke and Edelman noticed with relation 
to psychology and the neurosciences, that artificial 
intelligence as a discipline has somewhat isolated 
itself from large segments of research in natural 
language done by the human sciences and humanities. 
-------------~-----
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There seems to be a willingness to listen for what is 
immediately useable, but often all that is brought away 
is the terms of the other disciplines and vague 
understandings of concepts that are soon distorted to 
fit the assumptions held before. 
Artificial intelligence often resembles a bright 
young student with talent and ability but also a bad 
habit of ignoring the years of work done by his 
mentors. With seemingly endless energy and goals, he 
rushes blindly into projects with a 'do now, ask 
questions later' approach. After the few initial 
successes of his work, he makes bold predictions and 
claims for the future. But because he doesn't know the 
similar paths that have been followed before, his work 
starts to experience barriers due to his naivete. 
After struggling with the barriers, he crosses campus 
to see one of his mentors who "might" know something 
about the topic. Picking up a few concepts and a new 
group of terms from the mentor, the student rushes back 
to work, leaving his mentor saying, "This is that, 
but . . . But the student never hears the "but" part. 
Like the student, artificial intelligence in the 
past has had a tendency to extract information from 
other disciplines that it feels is necessary, but 
doesn't understand the conditions under which that 
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information is used in those fields. With regards to 
natural language research, artificial intelligence 
researchers have extracted the present terms and 
concepts from linguistics and philosophy of language 
and thrown them around in their research; but their 
research often lacks an understanding of the important 
pragmatic and social aspects of language acquisition 
and usage that form an essential part of human 
discourse. 
Now I might be a little too bold in saying it, but 
it seems as if artificial intelligence has started to 
mature. After coming up against endless roadblocks and 
traveling down blind alleys, the discipline in the last 
half-decade has begun to incorporate ideas from several 
different areas. Researchers have found that many of 
the problems that face artificial intelligence now have 
already been extensively researched and often overcome 
in associated fields. We even find established 
artificial intelligence researchers making whole 
crossovers to other disciplines, especially to 
psychology. 
With this willingness to step out of isolation, the 
discipline has experienced a gradual shift in focus. 
Whereas in the past research had focused overwhelmingly 
on computer programming, now a significant amount of 
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research is being done with and in the human sciences 
(e.g., linguistics, anthropology, neurobiology, and 
psychology). Appropriately artificial intelligence is 
also shifting more towards research in the humanities 
as philosophy and critical theory have made 
contributions to the questions of what humans, as 
models of intelligent behavior, accomplish with natural 
language. If a sustained trend, the future of 
artificial intelligence research will soon be focused 
heavily in the human sciences and humanities. 
Artificial Intelligence . . . and Rhetoric? 
First off, we need to dispel the myth that 
artificial intelligence has some direct link to 
computer science. Many artificial intelligence 
researchers (e.g., Margaret Boden and Patrick Winston) 
who have grown over-enamored by our silicon wonders go 
out of their way to stress the link between computers 
and artificial intelligence; but, historically and 
theoretically, no holy bond exists between these 
fields. In fact, as we will find out, the mindset in 
artificial intelligence that computers are necessary 
has restricted the growth of the discipline. Often 
researchers find very useful analogies from other 
------------------~~-----
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disciplines, then try to squash them into the confining 
hardware of a computer. 
To gain an objective view of the discipline, we 
must always remember that computers are nothing like 
human brains; so we have little reason to expect that 
they are the only other possible entity for artificial 
intelligence. Analogies between human brains and 
computers can often be misleading because they assume a 
natural connection between brain and computer. 
Currently, the only reason why computers and artificial 
intelligence are so closely associated is because 
computers have traditionally been used in research, 
nothing more. 
The focus of this work will be on natural language 
acquisition and usage as it pertains to artificial 
intelligence. By considering the qualities of natural 
language, an important issue that we will take up in 
this text is whether computers provide a proper 
framework for natural language. Due to the formal 
hardware of computers, artificial intelligence has 
relied heavily on the formal approaches to language 
that a few theories in linguistics can provide. 
However, as the discipline shifts focus and moves 
beyond the restrictive paradigm forced by a reliance on 
computers, we find ourselves free to pursue natural 
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language through different avenues. The real, not 
imagined, capabilities of computers are important 
considerations for our discussion. 
Therefore, in this text we will approach the issue 
of natural language in artificial intelligence on a 
different angle by recognizing its pragmatic purposes 
in social groups. Instead of looking at how human 
beings put sentences together and interpret words as 
traditional research has done, we will consider the 
language-in-use aspect of natural language as an 
important part of its acquisition and usage. Through 
an understanding of how humans employ the conventions 
of natural language in their social environments, we 
can better understand what would be required of 
machines that have language capabilities. 
Rhetoric provides direction in this area. As a 
discipline, rhetoric studies the pragmatic uses of 
natural language that artificial intelligence wants its 
machines to hav~. By considering the many parallels 
between rhetoric and artificial intelligence, this text 
will identify the qualities that a machine would need 
to use natural language rhetorically. 
But before people start dusting off the works of 
Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintillian, a 
clarification needs to be made: Rhetoric like many 
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other fields in the humanities can offer guidance as a 
mentor to natural language research in artificial 
intelligence, but extracting the terms and synthesizing 
concepts to fit a particular machine would be a naive 
mistake. As this text will attempt to do, drawing 
conclusions through considerations of rhetoric in 
artificial intelligence can provide insight into how 
intelligent machines can use natural language in social 
environments as humans do. However, restricting 
ourselves to a specific type of machine restricts our 
ability to understand what is needed for intelligence. 
In fact, the insights provided by rhetoric tend to 
guide us toward the proper type of machine needed for 
artificial intelligence rather than tell us how natural 
language can fit our current machines. 
The Purpose of This Text 
The purpose of this text is to build a bridge 
between established research in the humanities and 
research into artificial intelligence. The earlier 
sections of the text serve as an introduction to 
artificial intelligence in which the current issues and 
problems are discussed. The later sections move 
directly into issues that involve rhetoric and other 
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disciplines from the humanities such as philosophy and 
socio-linguistics. The last two sections draw direct 
parallels between rhetoric and artificial intelligence 
that show what type of machine would be needed to act 
rhetorically. Therefore, the discussion won't be 
flooded with the technical language that makes a great 
majority of artificial intelligence research 
inaccessable to researchers outside of the discipline. 
With some luck, the bridge developed by this text will 
help other researchers from the humanities recognize 
where their work could be followed by artificial 
intelligence. 
Already the bridges from psychology and linguistics 
are growing stronger; as the focus of artificial 
intelligence continues to shift toward the human 
sciences and humanities, these fields can take on a new 
importance to artificial intelligence research. 
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HISTORY AND DEFINITION 
For the little more than three decades since 
research into artificial intelligence emerged from the 
science of cybernetics, researchers have stretched the 
label "artificial intelligence" to represent so many 
diverse areas of research that a clear definition of 
the discipline is difficult to determine. Due to the 
public's lack of knowledge about the field, researchers 
have been able to repeatedly identify their research 
with the financially advantageous label of "artificial 
intelligence" while not working toward its goal of a 
machine that thinks. 
In this section we will discuss the changes in the 
discipline up until 1980 with special attention to 
issues of natural language usage. Through this 
historical context, we will look at what "traditional" 
artificial intelligence now holds up as the definition 
of "artificial intelligence" as compared to the 
original definition from the 1950s. And finally, to 
clear up ambiguities, this section will provide a clear 
definition of artificial intelligence that the rest of 
the text will follow. 
-------------------------------·----·"" 
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A Historical Background of Artificial Research to 1980 
In his book CYbernetics (1961), Norbert Weiner, the 
founder of cybernetic science, suggested that a 
possible practical application of cybernetic theory 
might allow scientists and engineers to develop 
machines that processed information similarly to human 
beings (Weiner 1961). Like Information Theory from 
which it emerged, cybernetics, as the science of 
communication and control in machine and animal, 
attempts to formalize all forms of communication into 
analytical constructs. In this way, researchers in 
cybernetics can apply analogous theories from 
statistical mechanics toward understanding the 
processes of communication in systems. Weiner felt 
that human communication processes could likewise be 
studied statistically and possibly applied to machine 
communication processes. 
Though more a mere suggestion on Weiner's part than 
a serious consideration, scientists took to the idea 
with some enthusiasm. With the advent of the atomic 
age and the many other engineering feats during the 
Second World War, the world had come to expect the 
unbelievable from technology. Consequently, when 
Atanasoff and Berry, working at Iowa State University, 
~--~--~----~~------------
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announced the invention of the digital computer, it 
wasn't long before scientists and engineers started to 
envision their products of electronic technology as 
more than expensive adding machines. Taking their 
roots and support from the successful research in 
cybernetic science, by the middle 1950s two distinct 
branches of artificial intelligence emerged with high 
expectations. 
The first branch, referred to as the "heuristic" 
branch in this text, found the newly invented digital 
computer to be a suitable framework in which human 
thought could be developed through proper programming. 
Recognizing digital computers as symbol manipulators, 
not just number manipulators, this branch felt that 
physical reality could be symbolically represented in 
the same way numbers were represented in the digital 
computer's binary framework. Allen Newell and Herbert 
Simon, leading researchers in this branch, set their 
belief down clearly as a hypothesis: 
The Physical Symbol System Hypothesis: A physical 
symbol system has the necessary and sufficient 
means for general intelligent action (Simon and 
Newell 1958). 
Following of post-behaviorist communication theories 
like formal versions of Peirce and Morris' theories of 
signs, Weiner's cybernetics, and the groundwork 
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theories in cognition, Newell and Simon viewed the 
manipulation of physical symbols in the brain and 
machine as the essential source for thought and 
understanding. 
Through conceiving of the mind as a manipulator of 
mental signs, Newell and Simon hypothesized that a 
physical symbol system of sufficient size could be 
considered "intelligent.·· They justified their use of 
digital computers as frameworks for artificial 
intelligence by arguing that though the brain and the 
computer possess different structures, they share a 
common bond as symbol manipulators. According to their 
hypothesis, by using programs to manipulate physical 
symbols through heuristics, the digital computer would 
be accomplishing an intelligent act similar to that 
accomplished by the human brain. Therefore, Newell and 
Simon argued, at an abstract level by manipulating 
physical symbols through formal rules, the brain and 
computer were indeed accomplishing the same tasks 
through different physical structures (Simon and Newell 
1958, Newell and Simon 1983). 
The second branch, referred to as the 
"connectionist" branch in this text, spurned the 
temptation to use the computer as a framework and 
instead chose to approach the development of artificial 
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intelligence by modeling the brain through the use of 
artificial "neurons." Inspired by the newly 
established field of neuroscience and recognizing the 
inherent complexity in formalizing intelligent 
processes, Frank Rosenblatt argued that developing and 
"training" an artificial brain would eliminate the need 
for programmed formal rules (Rosenblatt 1962). 
Through recent discoveries in neuroscience that 
biological neurons were stimulated in groups by 
patterns they recognized, he hypothesized that a 
network of artificial neurons could likewise be 
"taught" to recognize patterns. In essence, these 
networks would "learn" and respond to past experiences 
with recognized patterns; meanwhile, new experiences 
would be placed into the machine's memory by 
stimulating different groups of neurons. This approach 
avoided the difficult problems brought up by a 
necessity to formalize the procedures of the brain: 
Many of the models . . . are concerned with the 
question of what logical structure a system must 
have if it is to exhibit some property, X . 
An alternative way of looking at the question is: 
what kind of system can evolve property X? I 
think we can show in a number of interesting cases 
that the second question can be solved without 
having an answer to the first . 
. . . it is both easier and more profitable to 
axiomatize the physical system and then 
investigate this system analytically to determine 
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its behavior, than to axiomatize the behavior and 
then design a physical system by techniques of 
logical synthesis, which will in fact illuminate 
the functioning of the brain . . . that is to say, 
we can slate the types of systems which will 
evolve certain properties of interest without 
being able to say precisely what are the necessary 
organizational constraints in our finished system 
once it has completed its evolutionary process 
(Rosenblatt 1962). 
Sidestepping the problem of determining the formal 
rules supposedly followed by the brain, Rosenblatt 
advocated allowing the artificial brain to develop its 
own intellectual structure by allowing it to experience 
the patterns in the world around it. The connectionist 
machine would have the ability to "self-organize" 
information within its framework. Using this 
theoretical basis, Rosenblatt began developing what he 
called "perceptrons," networks of artificial neurons. 
Perceptrons were networks of analog electronic devices 
connected in parallel that were stimulated through 
sensors attached to the machine. 
Probably surprising the scientific community, by 
the late 1950s both research branches were claiming 
success and making bold predictions for the future. 
Having developed programs in digital computers that 
could use heuristics from deductive logic to prove 
theorems in propositional calculus, Newell and Simon 
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enthusiastically wrote in 1958: 
We now have the elements of a theory of heuristic 
(as contrasted with algorithmic) problem solving; 
and we can use this theory both to understand 
human heuristic processes and to simulate such 
processes with digital computers. Intuition, 
insight, and learning are no longer exclusive 
possessions of humans: any large high-speed 
computer can be programmed to exhibit them also 
(Simon and Newell 1958). 
Meanwhile, having taught a perceptron to recognize, 
classify, and separate similar patterns from dissimilar 
patterns, Rosenblatt wrote proudly in 1958: 
For the first time, we have a machine which is 
capable of having original ideas. As an analogue 
of the biological brain, the perceptron, more 
precisely, the theory of statistical separability, 
seems to come closer to meeting the requirements 
of a functional explanation ... As concept, it 
would seem that the perceptron has established, 
beyond doubt, the feasibility and principle of 
non-human systems which may embody human cognitive 
functions (Rosenblatt 1958). 
However, despite the predictions and high 
expectations, both branches soon ran into a problem 
that has plagued artificial intelligence research ever 
since, "combinitorial explosion." Combinatorial 
explosion occurs when the machine goes beyond simple 
puzzles and attempts to solve complex real-world 
problems. Though both branches had proven the ability 
to solve simple problems, attempts to upscale their 
machines to handle more multifaceted situations would 
--------------···--- ··----· 
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cause the computational needs of each system to grow 
exponentially instead of geometrically--or to put it 
more dramatically, the needs "exploded" (Rumelhart 
et al. 1986). 
Though the heuristic branch using computers could 
point to their machines' abilities to play checkers, 
real-world complexities such as natural language usage 
were clearly beyond the machines' capabilities. 
Likewise, though perceptrons had shown an ability to 
recognize simple patterns, their application to 
anything above that level was hampered by the 
sluggishness and inefficiency of their hardware. 
Competition and the death of connectionism 
The problems with combinatorial explosion quickly 
bogged down both branches. With the realization of a 
much larger problem than either branch had first 
anticipated, the middle 1960s brought on a sense of 
heavy competition as both approaches strived for 
recognition and government funding. With the 
enthusiastic claims made by artificial intelligence 
researchers in both branches, the Defense Department's 
Advanced Research Progects Agency (DARPA), as the 
primary source of funding for both branches, began 
expecting applicable results from the money it had 
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invested (Papert 1988). But neither approach could 
hold up any results with real-world applications. With 
the Vietnam war approaching, playing checkers wasn't 
seen as an advantage worth using research funds. 
In 1969, Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert, 
researching symbol manipulation on digital computers at 
MIT, published Perceptrons: An Introduction to 
Computational GeometrY. In the book, they analyzed 
their competititors' research into neural nets and 
artificial brains and concluded: 
The results of these hundreds of projects and 
experiments were generally disappointing, and the 
expectations inconclusive. The machines usually 
work quite well on very simple problems but 
deteriorate very rapidly as the tasks assigned to 
them get harder (Minsky and Papert 1969). 
Though the same could be said about heuristic 
artificial intelligence at the time, Minsky and Papert 
argued effectively from philosophical and technological 
perspectives that connectionist theory was misguided 
and infeasible (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1988). In a 
research field competing for recognition and money from 
a naive government, their arguments against perceptrons 
gained great influence--more than even they probably 
anticipated. 
Unable to defend itself from Minsky and Papert's 
allegations that perceptrons would never go beyond 
20 
simple pattern recognition problems, the connectionist 
approach found its funding drying up and being diverted 
into research using digital computers. By the early 
1970s, research into connectionist theory had all but 
ended, and symbol manipulating became the undisputed 
flag bearer for artificial intelligence. 
David Rumelhart and James McClelland wrote: 
Minsky and Papert's analysis of the limitations of 
the one-layer perceptron, coupled with some of the 
early successes of the symbolic processing 
approach in artificial intelligence, was enough to 
suggest to a large number of workers in the field 
that there was no future in perceptron-like 
computational devices for artificial intelligence 
and cognitive psychology (Rumelhart et al. 1986). 
Stagnation in heuristic artificial intelligence 
Despite their surprisingly easy victory over 
connectionist theory, the researchers in physical 
symbol manipulation still could not resolve their own 
problems with combinatorial explosion. As computer 
hardware improved, however, computers could work faster 
with much more data. A few ambitious researchers like 
Terry Winograd started attempting to program formalized 
syntactic features of natural language into their 
digital computers to manipulate words. Following the 
lead offered by Chomsky's theories of syntax, Winograd 
felt that "many of these (syntactic) rules could be 
------------- -- --------
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formulated in a precise way within a framework of 
mathematical computation theory" (Winograd 1976). 
However, even though they limited themselves to syntax, 
extrapolating their work into real language use by the 
machine required incredible computing power that 
dwarfed even their strongest computers. 
Also, Rosenblatt's observation, that formalizing 
the processes of human reasoning into heuristics would 
be very difficult, started to materialize as 
researchers like Winograd tried to program natural 
language into computers (Winograd and Flores 1986). 
Unlike checkers, chess, or other systems where the 
rules were well defined, natural language proved to be 
fluid-like and difficult to formalize. Their support 
in linguistics also started to erode. Trying to find 
such formal rules in language, linguists had 
concentrated on syntax alone, believing that theories 
incorporating semantics and pragmatics would be built 
up later around the syntactic hub. However, the works 
of Grice (1983) and Searle (1969) reinforced the 
importance of linguistic considerations of meaning to 
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syntactic competence. Winograd recognized this dilemma 
when he wrote: 
The computational mechanisms developed for 
theories of syntax are not adequate for larger 
questions of meaning and the structure of 
discourse (Winograd 1976). 
The heuristic branch's inability to answer 
questions of syntax, no less meaning, caused research 
to slow down considerably. Recognizing the extreme 
complexity of natural language use, heuristic 
artificial intelligence backed off from attempting to 
achieve language use as a whole. Heuristic researchers 
started to focus solely on developing machines that 
showed syntactic competence. The common belief with a 
taste of behaviorism was that if a computer can 
outwardly mimic a thinking human, whether it was 
actually thinking ~ a human or not was irrelevant 
(Rapaport 1988). 
Heuristic researchers had given up the goal of 
developing a thinking machine in favor of a machine 
that appears to simulate human thought. This change in 
goals represented a significant change on their parts 
in the definition of artificial intelligence. With 
their new definition, heuristic researchers started to 
view intelligence as an act outside the machine for 
-----------~ ~------ ~----~ 
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perceivers to determine, rather than an internal 
intellectual phenomena. 
Definitions of Artificial Intelligence 
As said earlier, a clear definition of the term 
"artificial intelligence" is non-existent. Researchers 
in the heuristic branch conceive of artificial 
intelligence quite differently than connectionists do. 
This ambiguity causes fundamental misunderstandings in 
the public about what exactly artificial intelligence 
research is trying to accomplish. To most people 
unfamiliar with the field, artificial intelligence is 
"that thing computer scientists are trying to develop." 
When engineers claim that their machines use 
"artificial intelligence," people start to wonder when 
these robots and such will start taking over the world 
as superior creatures to humans. And it doesn't help 
to have heuristic researchers like Marvin Minsky 
parading around claiming that "we'll be lucky if the 
next generation of computers will keep us around as 
pets" (Searle 1984). 
In truth, artificial intelligence, the heuristic 
branch particularly, thrives on the public's 
misconception of what researchers in this field are 
---------------------------
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actually doing. Its label has been stretched over so 
many diverse areas of research that "artificial 
intelligence" means nothing specific (Reeke and Edelman 
1988). And most artificial intelligence researchers 
indirectly promote the public's misconceptions by not 
clarifying their work. Hardly do the words "artificial 
intelligence" escape from their mouths before 
government and corporate funds start filling their 
budgets. Undeniably, a financial benefit exists if 
researchers can somehow slip their projects into this 
field. 
Therefore, in this section, we will clarify the 
many meanings of "artificial intelligence" by looking 
at what the field of artificial intelligence is trying 
accomplish. Then, we will set down a new, actually an 
old, definition of artificial intelligence that will be 
used for this text. 
The altered definition of artificial intelligence 
Some people like to refer to heuristic artificial 
intelligence as the "traditional branch." This 
designation exists because since the middle 1960s, the 
heuristic branch has dominated the field of artificial 
intelligence. Even now, a great majority of the work 
done under the label of "artificial intelligence" is 
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from the heuristic branch. So when we hear about 
machines that exhibit "artificial intelligence," 
generally what is meant is heuristic artificial 
intelligence. 
Marvin Minsky probably speaks for most of the 
heuristic branch when he defines an artificially 
intelligent machine as: 
A machine is artificially intelligent when it has 
the capabilities to do something that if done by a 
human would be considered intelligent (Minsky 
1986). 
In his influencial book, Artificial Intelligence, 
Patrick Winston defined artificial intelligence as: 
The study of ideas that enable computers to be 
intelligent (Winston 1984). 
Rather clearly, these present day definitions of 
heuristic artificial intelligence represent a shift 
away from Newell and Simon's conception of artificial 
intelligence. To them, thought was achieved through 
the manipulation of symbols. Under their conception of 
human reasoning and thought the digital computer and 
the brain were considered compatible media for thought. 
These pioneers felt that formalization of human thought 
and reasoning would provide the main challenge to 
achieving a thinking machine. A formidable task, they 
believed, but an achievable one. Simon and Newell 
------------------------------
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claimed quite boldly that by 1968, a digital computer 
will: 
--be the world's chess champion. 
--discover and prove an important new 
mathematical theorem. 
--write music that will be accepted by 
critics as possessing considerable aesthetic 
value. 
--cause most theories in psychology to take the 
form of computer programs, or of qualitative 
statements about the characteristics of computer 
programs (Simon and Newell 1958). 
It is quite clear that the pioneers in heuristic 
artificial intelligence believed that a computer could 
indeed achieve human intelligence, not just "do 
something that if done by a human would be considered 
intelligent." 
However, in present day heuristic artificial 
intelligence, we find that heuristic researchers no 
longer claim to be developing human thought in a 
machine. Instead, heuristic researchers have broken 
their definition of artificial intelligence into two 
parts, calling one pursuit "weak" artificial 
intelligence and the other "strong" artificial 
intelligence. Weak artificial intelligence is defined 
by Minsky's conception that a machine doing something 
that would be considered "intelligent" if done by a 
human shows artificial intelligence. Strong artificial 
intelligence is what Newell, Simon, Rosenblatt and most 
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people outside of the heuristic branch conceive of as 
artificial intelligence--a machine that possesses 
thought. 
Classifying artificial intelligence as "weak" and 
"strong" is somewhat deceptive. In weak artificial 
intelligence researchers are attempting to program 
computers to outwardly seem intelligent--to simulate 
human thought. Strong artificial intelligence, which 
no one in the heuristic branch is researching, is when 
a machine actually thinks as a human. Weak assumes the 
perception of intelligence by an outside source; strong 
assumes the actual existence of this intelligence 
within the machine. 
These conceptions of what artificial intelligence 
means are very different. However, the designation of 
weak/strong suggests that the two are similar. 
Heuristic researchers would have others believe that 
once they achieve weak artificial intelligence, it will 
only be a small step to further develop strong 
artificial intelligence. Later in this text, we will 
show that this is not the case. 
This text's definition of artificial intelligence 
So what is the definition of "artificial 
intelligence?" Newell, Simon, and Rosenblatt as 
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pioneers in the field felt that artificial intelligence 
was a machine's attainment of human thought. To clear 
up ambiguities and misconceptions, we need to 
re-establish an honest, direct definition of artificial 
intelligence that can define the discipline--no 
"weaks," no "strongs." Anything else that cannot 
conform to the definition of artificial intelligence 
shouldn't be classified as such. 
Newell, Simon, and Rosenblatt had the best 
conception of what artificial intelligence actually 
means. They fully believed in and pursued the 
possibility of a machine that thinks as a human. Their 
original goal represents the most straightforward 
concept of what we should expect from artificial 
intelligence research. Therefore, for this text, we 
will revert to their original definition of artificial 
intelligence. 
Definition: Artificial Intelligence exists when a 
machine thinks as a human. 
As in many other complex disciplines, the definition is 
simple, but flexible. Unlike the altered definitions 
used in the heuristic branch, no qualifiers are needed 
to direct which way this definition can be used; 
'machine' does not imply 'computer' and 'as' does not 
mean 'like' or 'simulate.' Finally, 'thinks as a 
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human' points out that we should use our best research 
into human thought processes to determine the 
definition of 'intelligence.' 
Conclusion 
Of course, many researchers will point out that we 
cannot jump right into developing machines that possess 
thought just because of a definition--much preliminary 
research needs to be done into both machines and the 
human brain. This is true. However, as in any 
scientific discipline, research should be able to 
extend itself through philosophy to show us why someday 
it might lead to its goals. Likewise, artificial 
intelligence should be able to provide a theoretical 
basis for believing it is in the right direction. 
In the next section of this text, we will be 
analyzing the philosophy behind present heuristic 
artificial intelligence research. The background 
information and definition in this section will provide 
a measuring stick against which we can measure the 
possibilities of success of natural language 
acquisition and usage by machines. 
---------- - --~----- ---
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NATURAL LANGUAGE AND HEURISTICS 
When asked whether machines could ever achieve 
artificial intelligence, Alan Turing, one of the first 
major figures in computer science, avoided answering 
the question directly by proposing a test that he felt 
would prove whether a machine could be considered 
"artificially intelligent." His test, the "Imitation 
Game" soon became the standard against which artificial 
intelligence measured itself. 
In the Imitation Game, Turing set up the following 
scenario: Allow two human beings and a machine to 
communicate freely through some medium that would not 
give away their identities. The humans and machine 
would then correspond amongst themselves with two 
intents: First, the humans would attempt to determine 
which one of the other two is the machine and which is 
the human; second, all three would attempt to convince 
the other two that they are human and not the machine. 
A machine could be considered "artificially 
intelligent" if it could consistently persuade each 
human that it, the machine, is the other human 
(Turing 1950). 
Despite the claim sometimes found in the popular 
media that a computer is acting "artificially 
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intelligent," the machines developed by artificial 
intelligence research have yet to pass the requirements 
of the Imitation Game. But the Imitation Game has 
provided a rather durable test against which 
theoretical models of artificial intelligence are 
tested. Unfortunately, it also has provided a 
multitude of different opinions as to what a machine 
would require to be considered intelligent. Since 
language usage represents one of the most obvious and 
important aspects of intelligence, most of these 
controversies center on the issue of machines using 
natural language. Invariably, natural language has 
been the primary barrier to success in artificial 
intelligence. 
The 1980s was a decade of re-evaluation for the 
heuristic branch as theorists and researchers sorted 
through the diverse opinions over the place and 
importance of natural language in artificial 
intelligence. As we start into the 1990s due to the 
barriers provided by natural language acquisition and 
usage, the theoretical position of heuristic artificial 
intelligence is more defined, but far narrower than 
that of only a decade ago. This section will discuss 
the contemporary theoretical approach of the heuristic 
branch to natural language acquisition and usage in 
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artificial intelligence and provide the reasoning 
behind its current assumptions. 
Syntax and Referents 
Taking Turing's imitation game at its surface, 
heuristic researchers have generally interpreted the 
game as showing that artificial intelligence primarily 
requires the outward simulation of thought by the 
machine. As a result, issues in natural language 
acquistion and usage have become the focal 
consideration in the heuristic branch as researchers 
attempt to program the outward appearances of human 
intelligence into a computer. Whether or not computers 
actually understand the meaning behind natural language 
usage is seen as less a concern than the proper outward 
use of the language symbols. Most heuristic 
researchers believe that language competence to 
persuade or "fool" the humans into believing the 
machine thinks is the most important feature of an 
artificially intelligent machine (Rapaport 1988). 
Assuming human mental processes to be formally 
cognitive and deterministic, the heuristic branch's 
goal is to formalize the activities of humans into 
heuristics so that the computer can simulate cognitive 
-------------- --
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abilities (Schank 1986). Likewise with natural 
language, they feel that language processes can be 
formalized into common syntactic structures that 
computers can use to interpret and respond to inputted 
sentences. 
For this reason, current heuristic artificial 
intelligence inquiry into natural language focuses 
mainly on issues of syntactic competence. Though many 
researchers claim to be working with word meanings, 
their formal systems for semantics usually represent 
limited support systems for the syntactic processes of 
their computers. This focus on the outward simulation 
of natural language use results from two major 
limitations to heuristic artificial intelligence: 
first, as we will discuss later, the computer has a 
formal framework that can only accept determined 
constants; second, research into semantics by 
linguistics and the philosophy of language, though very 
successful theoretically, hasn't provided a clear 
picture of how semantics can by formalized for a 
computer. So in their desire to start programming, 
heuristic researchers have accepted formal views of 
linguistics with their own synthetic concepts of 
formalized semantics. 
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We can see the development of the heuristic 
branch's current theories toward natural language as 
progressive attempts to further accommodate for 
semantics through considerations of syntax. The first 
researchers focused on keyword search programs that had 
almost no attempts to gain a sense of meaning of words. 
A good example of this approach was Weizenbaum's ELIZA 
program (Weizenbaum 1966, 1967) Here is a small 
transcript of a conversation with ELIZA: 
User: 
ELIZA: 
User: 
ELIZA: 
User: 
ELIZA: 
User: 
ELIZA: 
Men are all alike. 
In what way? 
They're always bugging us about something 
or other. 
Can you think of a specific example? 
Well, my boyfriend made me come here. 
Your boyfriend made you come here. 
He says I'm depressed much of the time. 
I am sorry to hear that you are depressed. 
The program works through a simple process to make its 
responses. It uses either stock phrases like "In what 
way?" or it inserts sentence fragments from the user's 
previous sentence into programmed response patterns. 
Working through these syntactic patterns, the computer 
itself really has no concept of meaning, though at 
times its use of language might give the impression 
that it does (Ritchie and Thompson 1983). 
The limitations of programs like ELIZA to make 
meaning connections with words led researchers in the 
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early 1970s to look into ways to develop limited 
semantic qualities within the computer software. The 
common approach was to use formalized semantic 
referents to equate and define each symbol with a set 
of semantic qualities. A good example of this approach 
is Winograd's SHRDLU program in which the computer 
could converse with a human about a simple system 
called "BLOCKS world" (Winograd 1972, 1976). Here is 
an example of a conversation with SHRDLU in BLOCKS 
world: 
User: pick up a red block. 
SHRDLU: OK 
User: grasp the pyramid. 
SHRDLU: I dont understand which pyramid you mean. 
User: what does the box contain. 
SHRDLU: The blue pyramid and the blue block. 
User: what is the pyramid supported by? 
SHRDLU: The box. 
The computer can identify different entities 
through binary referents. For example, the red block 
might have the following features: [+red], 
[+flat top]; while the blue pyramid would have 
different features: [- red], [- flat top]. 
Corresponding to these features would be rules such as 
an entity can be placed on a [+flat top], but an 
entity cannot be placed on a [-flat top]. 
To his credit, Winograd was the first to point out 
the severe limitations of SHRDLU, but he and many 
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others saw it as a step toward semantics. At the time, 
when most computer programs focused on parsing routines 
to identify the grammatical structure of sentences, 
SHRDLU through its synthetic semantic referents did to 
a certain extent have a crude sense of meaning. By 
breaking meaning down into formal referents, the 
simplistic features and rules of the entities of 
"BLOCKS world" could be defined and programmed into 
computer frameworks. Terry Winograd in 1976 recognized 
the need for considerations of semantics by identifying 
the same shift away from syntax-based paradigms in 
linguistics when he wrote: 
Much of the early successes of this approach was 
based on a narrow concentration on problems of 
syntax, avoiding issues of meaning and · 
communications in language use. From a 
commonsense point of view, communication and 
meaning are much more central to a theory of 
language than the details of word ordering. But 
paradoxically, this centricity makes them harder 
to attack theoretically. They are so intertwined 
with our basic ability to think and reason that it 
becomes impossible to talk about them as a 
separate f~eld of study. In order to avoid this, 
linguists concentrated on syntax alone, and 
believed that more comprehensive theories could be 
built later around the syntactic core. 
There is much current dissatisfaction with this 
restrictive paradigm, and many prominent linguists 
are beginning to reject a syntax-dominated 
approach and to look at these broader issues 
(Winograd 1976). 
---------------~·-··-· -- --· ·--
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At the time, Winograd felt that heuristic artificial 
intelligence would provide a valuable tool for this new 
emphasis on semantics in linguistics. 
Heuristic Frames and Scripts 
These attempts lead us to the present direction of 
research in heuristic artificial intelligence. Many 
programs like SHRDLU were built with meaning referents, 
but attempts to extend these programs beyond simple 
environments like BLOCKS world met again with the 
problems of combinatorial explosion in two forms: 
1. Whereas SHRDLU used simple, predictable sentence 
structures, linguists had found the sentence 
structures used by humans to be more complex than 
first anticipated by generative grammar theories. 
Due to this complexity, computers struggled to 
analyze the many variations in human sentence use. 
2. Entities, more complex than Winograd's 
hypothetical ones, needed extensive definitions 
through referents. A hypothetical block could be 
formalized into simple referents, but real-world 
entities needed extensive referential definitions 
to distinguish themselves from other entities 
(e.g. the differences between two like items such 
as two different humans.) 
But a third, more important problem surfaced. 
Whether or not they could manipulate the language or 
even give words some sense of meaning, these computers 
were not doing anything that humans do. They 
represented silicon slaves that would pull apart 
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instructions from a user and accomplish a hypothetical 
task. Obviously, human beings do more with natural 
language than just follow orders in an order-action, 
stimulous-response fashion. Unlike humans who possess 
intentional behavior, computer programs like SHRDLU 
could not act pragmatically. 
For this reason, present heuristic artificial 
intelligence follows synthetic theories that attempt to 
formalize behavior processes and natural language into 
formal systems that try to accommodate aspects of 
syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. 
Followed in different forms, Marvin Minsky's 
concept of "frames" in human behavior and natural 
language is still the motivating theoretical approach 
for the heuristic branch (Minsky 1986). Minsky, 
following work in cognitive science, hypothesizes that 
humans only need to reference certain categories of 
information in different situations. By referencing 
stored information in chunks of relevant material, the 
computer, he argues, can avoid combinational explosion 
by limiting its information set to what is needed in 
the present situation. Therefore, computers cut down 
on their needed computations considerably because they 
don't need to search through their entire data bases. 
-------···~·--
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Taking this concept of frames one step further, 
Schank and Abelson added a formal sense of timed 
sequence to the use of frames (Schank and Abelson 1977, 
Schank 1986). They hypothesized that humans follow 
heuristics of behavior, referencing material based on 
the present point in a relevant behavior heuristic. By 
trying to understand human behavior, they hoped to draw 
the focus of the heuristic branch away from the 
complexities of syntactic sentence manipulations toward 
understandings of semantics and pragmatics. Schank and 
Abelson's best example of a script is that of the 
restaurant script: 
Consider, for example, the following situation. 
Imagine that you are hungry and that someone 
suggests a marvelous restaurant to you called 
Burger King. You happily go to this restaurant, 
armed as you always are, with a set of 
expectations about what will happen there. 
Specifically, you expect that you will: ENTER; BE 
SEATED; GET & READ MENU; ORDER; BE SERVED; PAY; 
and EXIT. 
Each of the bold faced "scenes" represent 
expectations of their own and are handled through 
their individual scripts (Schank 1986). 
Since Schank and Abelson's hypothesis, frames, scripts 
and their counterparts have represented the main 
theoretical approach in heuristic artificial 
intelligence. The heuristic branch believes that human 
----------- -----~--~ 
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behavior and natural language, understood as scripts, 
can be codifiable into heuristics for programming into 
a computer. With a large grouping of these scripts and 
a large data base, the computer, they feel, can act and 
speak like a human being. 
Ideally, when a question or statement is posed to 
the computer, it would find the "task environment," 
that serves the particular input, "search" among 
alternative courses of action in its database, and make 
a "choice" that best achieves the desired goals 
(Winograd and Flores 1986). To accommodate for 
semantic issues, Schank hypothesized that meaning can 
be broken down into "primitives" in much the same way 
that SHRDLU used referents. Except in his 
understanding of semantics, Schank argued that only a 
small set of primitive elements are needed to build up 
meaning of all concepts in natural language (Schank 
1975). Therefore, meaning could be simplified into 
basic "actions" that can be used as descriptions of 
items in categories. 
Schank points to the success of the frame/script 
approach in the form of computer programs that ask 
questions about a news event. Here is a transcript of 
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a question-answer encounter with a program called CYRUS 
(the computer asks the questions and Schank provides 
the answers): 
Initial User Question: Has Vance's wife ever met 
Mrs. Begin? 
Ql: Did your wife ever meet Mrs. Begin? 
Q2: Where would they have met? 
Q3: Under what circumstances do diplomat's 
wives meet? 
Q4: Under what circumstances do diplomats 
meet? 
A4: On state visits to each other's 
countries. At international 
conferences. 
A3: When they accompany their husband's on 
these visits. 
Q3a: When did Vance go to Isreal? 
Q3b: When did Begin go to the U. S.? 
A3a/A3b: various dates can now be retrieved 
from memory 
Q3c: Did their wives accompany them on any of 
these trips? 
A3c: a trip where this happened is found 
Q2a: During what part of a trip would wives 
meet? 
A2a: during a state dinner 
Final Revised Question: Was there a state dinner 
on May 24, 1977 during the diplomatic visit that 
Vance made to Isreal with his wife? 
Answer (A1): Probably on May 24, 1977, in 
Jerusalem at a state dinner in which they were 
both present. 
CYRUS' answer to initial question: YES, MOST 
RECENTLY AT A STATE DINNER IN ISREAL IN JAN 1980. 
(Schank 1986). 
With limited consideration of their own theoretical 
basis, this program CYRUS, which represents one of the 
more advanced language using products of the heuristic 
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branch, suffers from limitations that have troubled 
other heuristic approaches in the past. These types of 
programs still act in severely limited environments 
through stereotyped versions of what humans actually 
do. 
Let's consider Schank's "restaurant script" for a 
moment. Those of us who have been to Burger King (the 
restaurant in his example) know well that this 
particular script would leave a computer sitting at a 
table hopelessly expecting a menu to be brought to it. 
Schank argues that the computer can mark the places 
where the script fails for future reference and ideally 
develop new scripts based on the new experience. Of 
course, the programmer could provide a special script 
for restaurants like Burger King (and McDonald's, Maid 
Rite, and White Castle) also, but the amount of scripts 
needed to handle the situations humans normally face 
would be enormous. Just the computation power needed 
to anticipate and accomplish even the most basic of 
human actions (like eating at a restaurant) invariably 
dwarfs the strongest, most expensive computers. 
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Searle's Chinese Room Argument 
Of course, there have always been critics of 
artificial intelligence. Norbert Weiner and Alan 
Turing were among the first critics of the field when 
they asked whether we should even want thinking 
machines. But criticism in the 1980s and 1990s has 
become more specific than moralistic, being most 
relevant and most damning for the heuristic branch. 
Instead of asking hQH computers can achieve thought, we 
find most criticism arguing effectively that they will 
never achieve thought. 
Until the 1980s, heuristic artificial intelligence 
researchers had no qualms about accepting the claim 
that they were working toward the ultimate goal of 
"strong artificial intelligence," the development of a 
"mind" in computers. Hubert Dreyfus, a philosopher, 
made some provoking arguments against heuristic 
artificial intelligence in his book Wbat Computers 
Can't Do (1979). If anything, though, heuristic 
researchers realized that philosophers were a threat 
and started to ignore them as much as possible. The 
goal of a cognitive computer seemed to be further in 
the distance than originally anticipated, but they 
always assumed that they were on the right track. The 
44 
designations of "weak" and "strong" were seen more as 
the two ends of a spectrum that would allow them to 
apply their research in "weak" artificial intelligence 
to future research in "strong" artificial intelligence. 
However, the distinctions between the two approaches 
have since grown further apart, leaving two separate 
camps. In the minds of heuristic researchers, "strong 
artificial intelligence" is more a case of distant 
future research than an immediate extension of their 
work. 
This withdrawal into the confines of "weak" 
artificial intelligence was primarily due to a 
re-evaluation of the goals of artificial intelligence 
and a recognition of the limitations of the computer 
during the 1980s. Until then, critics of artificial 
intelligence had mainly centered on questions of 
whether a computer could encompass human qualities like 
love, empathy for humans, and human nature. But in 
1980, John Searle, a speech acts theorist, delivered a 
scathing attack on the belief that computers could be 
programmed to "think." He viewed the heuristic 
branch's focus on outwardly simulating human thought as 
a return to behaviorism, since it claimed (as in its 
interpretation of Turing's Imitation Game) that the 
apprearance of intelligence means something ~ 
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intelligent (Searle 1984). His argument centered on a 
thought experiment he had devised called the Chinese 
Room Argument: 
Minds are semantical, in the sense that they have 
more than a formal structure, they have a 
content .... 
Imagine that you are locked in a room, and in this 
room are several baskets full of Chinese symbols. 
Imagine that you (like me) do not understand a 
word of Chinese, but that you are given a rule 
book in English for manipulating these Chinese 
symbols. The rules specify the manipulations of 
the symbols purely formally, in terms of their 
syntax, not their semantics. So the rule might 
say: 'Take a squiggle-squiggle sign out of basket 
number one and put it next to a squoggle-squoggle 
sign from basket number two.' Now suppose that 
some other Chinese symbols are passed into the 
room, and that you .are given further rules for 
passing back Chinese symbols out of the room. 
Suppose that unknown to you the symbols passed 
into the room are called 'questions' by the people 
outside the room, and the symbols you pass back 
out of the room are called 'answers to questions.' 
Suppose, furthermore, that the programmers are so 
good at designing the programs and that you are so 
good at manipulating the symbols, that very soon 
your answers are indistinguishable from those of a 
native Chinese speaker. There you are locked in 
your room shuffling your Chinese symbols and 
passing out Chinese symbols in response to 
incoming Chinese symbols. On the basis of the 
situation as I have described it, there is no way 
you could learn any Chinese simply by manipulating 
these formal symbols. 
Now the point of the story is simply this: by 
virtue of implementing a formal computer program 
from the point of view of an outside observer, you 
behave exactly as if you understand Chinese, but 
all the same you don't understand a word of 
Chinese (Searle 1984). 
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Searle's conclusion from his Chinese Room argument is 
that the formal systems which computers need are 
insufficient for the real semantic understanding that 
humans possess. Whereas the programmers of formal 
systems through scripts prescribe limited "meanings" 
for words through referents and primitives, humans 
actually experience the real meaning behind the words 
in the real world. Therefore, he argues, since 
computers cannot overcome their syntactic frameworks, 
they will never understand natural language and cannot 
become minds (Searle 1984). 
Searle had effectively questioned the synthetic 
theories of syntax, semantics, and pragmatics held by 
the heuristic branch and reduced them back to modified 
theories of symbol manipulation. Meaning in formal 
systems used by computers was merely a product of other 
meaningless symbols put together into chunks as a 
definition. The Chinese Room Argument was a direct 
response to Schank and Abelson's conception that the 
mind worked with scripts that could be formalized. 
As Searle points out, computers are symbol 
dependent machines that don't and can't have any 
understanding of the symbols they manipulate. Their 
restriction to symbol manipulation arises because the 
hardware of computers forces them to operate by moving 
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meaningless charges through a formal framework. A word 
with a set of referents as defining characteristics for 
an entity doesn't give it a real sense of meaning, 
because the referents represent syntactic constructions 
themselves. 
Schank did anticipate this problem of the 
difference between formal system meaning and semantic 
meaning. His adaptation of the theory of "primitive" 
elements of meaning is one in which a few certain 
actions are basic to reality and can be used to explain 
all concepts (Schank 1975). At these points, if his 
theory was correct, meaning and symbol in mind and 
computer has a determined essence. Therefore, 
identifying these primitives and building all word 
meanings on them would allow the machine to make a 
direct connection between symbol and real meaning. 
However, as Katz and Fodor (1963) pointed out and our 
discussion of rationalism will show later in this text, 
this concept of primitives has its own problems. 
Heuristic Artificial Intelligence Now 
Searle's allegations that computers would never be 
able to understand language denied quite clearly that 
Newell and Simon's original goal of a "thinking" 
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computer would be attainable. After some re-evaluation 
of their work and a few feeble attempts to defend their 
projects, heuristic researchers have since settled on a 
rather simple defense. They reluctantly accept 
Searle's argument, but claim that he attacked the wrong 
type of artificial intelligence. He attacked "strong" 
artificial intelligence while they are working on 
"weak" artificial intelligence (Moor 1988, Rapaport 
1988). 
By making this concession, however, the once 
envisioned spectrum in heuristic branch between weak 
and strong changed into two separate camps. They argue 
that the strong camp, which no one really works in, is 
attempting to build machines that actually think; the 
weak camp, which they all are working in, is attempting 
to program computers to appear to simulate human 
thought. 
However, where natural language is concerned, 
questions of real semantics eventually need to be 
addressed. Recognizing the problems involved with 
referents, the modern science of linguistics considers 
this approach to semantics to be hopelessly flawed 
(O'Grady et al. 1989). So what we are left with is the 
recognition that a computer can be programmed to use 
the symbols of natural language; but at some point, to 
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interact in language, the computer must be able to 
assign some form of real meaning to words, not a 
determined set of qualities. In the case of weak 
researchers, the question is whether computers can be 
programmed to be so dexterious in language that they 
can pass Turing's Imitation Game without an 
understanding of the words they use. These weak 
heuristic researchers claim that a powerful enough 
computer could manipulate the symbols of natural 
language well enough that the simulation of human 
thought would convince humans that the computer is 
actually thinking. William Rapaport writes: 
Understanding has to do with meaning, and meaning 
is the province of semantics. Several recent 
attacks on the possibility of a computer's 
understanding natural language have take the line 
that computers can only do syntax, not semantics, 
and, hence, cannot understand natural language. 
Briefly, my thesis in this essay is that syntax 
suffices (Rapaport 1988). 
Rapaport's position, due to the framework of 
computers, is that held by the heuristic branch. It 
believes that outward symbolic competence is the 
guiding force behind the use of natural language, and 
that formally defined meaning is needed for success in 
natural language acquisition and usage. Though 
heuristic researchers will concede that questions of 
real semantics are important, they argue that at the 
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present time research can first concentrate on 
developing computers that use the symbols or words of 
language correctly. Once syntactic ability is 
confirmed, they believe, research into semantics can 
then be considered--if necessary. 
Conclusion 
With their restriction to mere symbol manipulation, 
can computers gain the ability to acquire and use 
natural language with the effectiveness required by 
everyday social interactions? Resolving that issue is 
the focus of the next two sections. Searle showed 
through his Chinese Room Argument that computers cannot 
"think" because they do not have the adequate hardware 
to understand the semantic content of words. The 
question now becomes whether the dexterous use of 
natural language without semantics will allow computers 
to communicate effectively in spite of their handicap. 
In the next section we will discuss the 
philosophical considerations of heuristic artificial 
intelligence that are a result of the hardware of 
computers. By identifying computers through the 
terminology of the humanities in both philosophy and 
--~---~----------------------~ -~------
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rhetoric, we can better discuss their capabilities with 
relation to human capabilities in the real world. 
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RATIONALISM, DIALECTIC, AND COMPUTERS 
Despite their often complex surface capabilities, 
digital computers are relatively elementary machines 
working through rapid, but simple, calculations. 
Though multifaceted higher level programming languages 
like Pascal, FORTRAN, and LISP can be used to access 
computers, at machine level computers work by 
synthesizing all information into simple binarisms of 
"charged" and "not-charged" states. Even the binary 
arithmatic features of ones and zeroes commonly 
connected to these states are made through the 
interpretation of programmers, not the computers. By 
putting together strings of these charged or 
not-charged states through programmed heuristics, 
computers can represent things in memory, most commonly 
numbers (Reges 1987). 
These points are important because a popular 
misconception held by and about heuristic artificial 
intelligence is that better computers through future 
technology will allow us to develop thought and natural 
language use in them. In reality, the computers we 
have now and will have in the future only represent 
faster and stronger versions of that machine invented 
by Atanasoff and Berry nearly a half century ago. From 
--------------------------------------------
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the largest supercomputer to the simplist calculator, 
computers are weaker or stronger versions of the same 
machine: they are all binary digital computers, Von 
Neumann machines. The difference between the 
capabilities of digital computers depends only on their 
speed, power, and software. 
Ironically, computer hardwares gain such 
applicability and power from their extreme simplicity. 
Whereas biological beings work through integrational 
and unpredictable neurological processes, computers 
work freely without meaning to slow them down. With 
the human brain, even the simplist of mathematical 
calculation has some form of meaning involved: 
dollars, apples and oranges, 1-2-3. For computers, 
calculation is just charges moving around in formal 
binary electronic frameworks. The meaning that humans 
possess is not used by the computer, and the 
responsibility for corresponding meaning to outputted 
information from computers rests only with their users. 
Some characteristics that define computer 
frameworks are as follows: 
-Computers are formally systemic. 
-Computers as binary calculators rely on deductive 
logic. 
-Computers as formal systems require formal 
heuristics (software). 
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-Computers cannot associate real meaning to 
symbols, restricting them to syntactic 
operations. 
Paradoxically, as Searle points out, whereas these 
characteristics allow computers freedom from meaning in 
calculation, they also deny computers the abilities to 
achieve thought (Searle 1984). 
In this section, we will take a closer look at 
computers. Through this discussion of the computer 
through an identification of it in philosophy and 
rhetoric, the capabilities and limitations of computers 
will become clearer later in the text. This road has 
been travelled before by Dreyfus (1979) and most 
recently by Winograd and Flores (1986). Though 
overlapping some of their work, this section will make 
stronger a couple of their points and provide a 
slightly different theoretical angle for reference to 
rhetoric. Our goal is to identify the philosophy 
beneath the heuristic branch so we can test its 
theoretical compatibility with theory in natural 
language. 
Rationalism and the Computer 
In our time of technology, our society rarely asks 
Hbx things are the way they are without immediately 
following with a question about b2H that knowledge can 
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be applied. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
heuristic artificial intelligence. Whereas other 
fields attempt to touch base with some groundwork in 
philosophy, heuristic artificial intelligence is 
content to assume that it is on the right path, rarely 
trying to determine whether its assumptions are 
philosophically sound. Although artificial 
intelligence researchers roll their eyes when those 
"philosophers" approach their work, we find that their 
lack of knowledge about philosophy is actually 
restricting their work. 
This restriction occurs because the formally 
systemic framework of computers forces research on them 
to rely strictly on the doctrines of rationalism. 
Preceding computer science by some two thousand years, 
Plato and Aristotle first outlined the basics of 
rationalism in which reality was first understood as 
inherently formally systemic. Underlying almost all 
current paradigms of thought in western culture, 
Plato's metaphysics and Aristotle's categories laid the 
foundation for their concept of a formal universe built 
on primitives and rules (Kent 1989). Rationalism 
specifies that reality can be codified into universal 
concepts and formalizations that directly mirror the 
processes of the mental and physical universe. It 
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allows empirical science and its philosophy to 
categorize, label, and formalize reality, giving us the 
ability to build higher levels of structure by 
understanding the structures beneath. Reality through 
rationalism can be viewed as ultimately deterministic 
in which knowing the primitive elements of reality and 
how they interact would allow one to determine the 
future movements of all matter. 
As in all formal systems, rationalism's formal 
system of reality has certain conditions that need to 
be met. First, formal systems are built on basic 
elements, individual items to be manipulated. Second, 
formal systems require strict rules that dictate how 
the elements interact and influence one another. For 
example, consider a billiards table and pool balls as a 
system. The pool balls represent the elements to be 
manipulated with the table representing the constraints 
of their surroundings. According to rationalism, the 
pool balls follow specific physical rules of motion 
dictated by physical laws that can be formalized 
directly into mathematics. Any deviance from these 
rules is viewed as either the fault of the measuring 
device or a flaw in the system or both. In an ''ideal" 
formal system, all future actions can be determined by 
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those in the past. Formal systems are inflexibly 
deterministic. 
But the rationalist conception of a formal systemic 
reality specifies a need for "primitive" elements upon 
which all reality is built--an indivisible "atom," an 
undeniable elemental "truth." All through the history 
of rationalism, scientists and philosophers have tried 
and failed to identify these primitives, but their 
existence has always been assumed. This blind faith is 
necessary, because without the existence of primitives, 
rationalism's foundational belief in a formally 
systemic reality falls apart (Wittgenstein 1959). 
Rationalism in the spirit of Aristotle has taken on 
many forms and dominated Western philosophy as 
scientists, philosophers, rhetoricians, mathematicians, 
and logicians started concentrating their efforts 
toward formalizing their analyses of reality. In 
science they searched for the basic primitives of 
matter and formaiized physical interactions. In logic 
and rhetoric, they searched for undeniable "truths" and 
developed heuristics of human reasoning in the form of 
first order predicate calculus (Russell 1959). Later, 
in linguistics, cognition, and psychology, they 
searched for elements of "deep structures" of language 
and mind. 
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With its assumption of formal systemic reality, the 
rationalist epistemology supports the conception that 
eternal forms and categories are the center of all 
things (Kent 1989). These categories, rationalism 
asserts, are formal and inherent in the universe, and 
need only to be discovered by probing beneath the 
obvious for further truths. Somewhere, it was 
believed, a structure or structures guide reality in a 
deterministic way. And to isolate and formalize these 
structures became the duty of empirical studies in the 
Kantian tradition. Finding the "primitives·· of 
reality, philosophers could then discover other higher 
level aspects of reality through deductive heuristics. 
Heuristic artificial intelligence is a direct 
product of rationalism. In their systemic framework, 
computers deductively manipulate elements (data) 
through formal heuristics (programs). Computers work 
on the assumption that every statement or piece of 
information can be synthesized into bits of "truth" or 
"not-truth" at a basic level. When Newell and Simon 
proposed their Physical Symbol Hypothesis, they claimed 
to be following the doctrines of rationalists like 
Frege, Russell, and Whitehead (Newell and Simon 1981). 
They used the theories of rationalism by assuming that 
the human brain as part of reality is also formally 
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systemic, working with primitives and formal heuristics 
when it thinks. Therefore, they concluded, the two 
machines, brain and computer, were accomplishing the 
same task. 
So why is this connection between heuristic 
artificial intelligence and rationalism important? To 
answer this question, we turn to Winograd and Flores' 
work in Understanding Computers and Cognition. In one 
of the more surprising turnabouts in artificial 
intelligence, Terry Winograd, one of the most important 
heuristic branch members of the 1970s and early 1980s, 
is now one of the branch's strongest critics. In this 
text regarding the capabilities of computers, he and 
Flores argue against using computers in artificial 
intelligence because computer science is too reliant on 
the doctrines of the rationalistic tradition of Western 
culture: 
Current thinking about computers and their impact 
on society has been shaped by a rationalistic 
tradition that needs to be re-examined and 
challenged as a source of understanding 
(Winograd and Flores 1986). 
But their assessment needs to be taken even one step 
further, though, because the rationalist paradigm does 
more than "shape" heuristic artificial intelligence 
research. The formally systemic hardware of computers 
---· -~------ --- . ---~---· -----
60 
forces research done on them to rely on rationalism. 
With their need for determined truths and formal logic, 
computers, with their formal frameworks, are the 
representation of rationalism in machine form (Dreyfus 
1979). Originally invented for mathematical 
computation, another product of rationalism, they are 
restricted to the same paradigm. Therefore, heuristic 
artificial intelligence does more than just follow 
rationalism; it is dependent on it. 
In regard to developing human intelligence on 
computers, the formalistic, systemic framework of 
computers forces heuristic research to assume that 
human reasoning and natural language are also formally 
systemic. Otherwise, computers would provide 
incompatible frameworks on which to build human thought 
and language. Therefore, any questions about the 
validity of rationalism directly concern any attempts 
to develop intelligence in a computer. 
Computer as Dialectic 
With the recognition of computers and heuristic 
artificial intelligence as inseparably linked with 
rationalism, we can now map out the position and 
restrictions of heuristic artificial intelligence with 
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regard to rhetoric. According to Aristotle, discourse 
separates into two branches, dialectic and rhetoric. 
Dialectic is a formal system that has two reasoning 
processes, deduction and induction; rhetoric is 
informal and has two corresponding reasoning processes, 
enthymeme and example. Though attempts have been made 
to subjugate rhetoric to dialectic within the 
rationalist paradigm, Aristotle in his statement 
"Rhetoric is a counterpart to Dialectic" (1354al) saw 
them as equivalents. 
Dialectic, Plato's preferred form of discourse, is 
based on the assumption that one can arrive at truth by 
starting from proven truths and working properly 
through formal logic to a conclusion (Kennedy 1980). 
Ideally, speakers using dialectic follow syllogisms to 
deductively develop further truths from true premises. 
We find this type of reasoning best evidenced in 
Plato's Gorgias in which the character of Socrates, by 
virtue of working through "indisputable" truths, comes 
to logically "correct" conclusions. His opponents, not 
working from basic truths, are dispatched because of 
their unsound conclusions. 
Rhetoric, best exemplified by Aristotle, is a 
recognition that truth is not always attainable in 
social situations, or for that matter even 
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desirable (1355a10). Unlike dialectic in which a 
person logically arrives at a conclusion, rhetoric 
requires speakers to start out with a recognition of 
the desired conclusion. With their desired conclusions 
as their goals, speakers using rhetoric attempt to 
persuade their audience that their original conclusion 
can be accepted as probablY true (1355b26). Rhetoric's 
equivalent to the syllogism is the enthymeme in which 
one makes probable conclusions based on incomplete sets 
of premises. Likewise, through examples, as rhetoric's 
equivalent to induction in dialectic, one can show 
through past situations that the desired conclusion is 
probably true (1355a9). 
There's an important distinction between dialectic 
and rhetoric that separates them from one another. 
Dialectic, as the formal reasoning process, works 
toward an unknown truth from previously determined 
primitives of truth through prescribed logical 
heuristics. Rhetoric, as an informal process in which 
social considerations play a large role, works toward 
the speakers' desired versions of truth where truth 
isn't often clear. Therefore, rhetoric, unlike 
dialectic, is a social act in which the desires and 
motivations of an audience need to be considered. So 
the important distinction between dialectic and 
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rhetoric is that in dialectic reasoning processes, 
absolute truth is arrived at through proper 
manipulations of previously determined truths; in 
rhetorical reasoning processes, one finds the proper 
means of persuading an audience that the desired 
conclusion is probably true. Whereas dialectic 
discovers the conclusion, rhetoric starts with it. 
For heuristic artificial intelligence, these 
distinctions are important as we identify computers in 
philosophy and rhetoric. Considering the distinctions 
between the two branches of discourse, dialectic and 
rhetoric, we can easily identify computers as 
dialectic, deductive machines. Computers, as 
prescribed by dialectic reasoning, work with elemental 
truths through formal deductive logic to arrive at 
further absolute truth. Their conclusions are the 
results of their formal activities and, barring 
malfunctions in the computer hardware, can be 
considered logically valid and true. Because the 
programmer is responsible for the correctness of the 
elements represented in the database and the inputed 
data, the binary framework operates formally on the 
assumption that truth exists. 
Considering that discourse, according to Aristotle, 
can be divided into four categories (deduction, 
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induction, enthymeme, and example), we would have to 
conclude that the binary formal frameworks of computers 
allow them to reason through only one-fourth of the 
categories in discourse. Computers through their 
hardware are restricted to deduction in dialectic 
analysis--induction requires an ability to reason 
non-monotonically (Rankin 1988). Their inability to 
predetermine a conclusion, and their need for 
formalized truth and complete sets of true premises 
restricts them from rhetoric altogether. So computers 
for placement with relation to rhetoric can be defined 
as strictly dialectic, deductive machines. 
Conclusion 
Now according to rationalism, these restrictions 
shouldn't hurt the chances of computers for gaining 
thought and natural language usage. Dialectics, as 
long as the primitive truths are programmed into 
memory, specifies that computers will come out with the 
correct conclusions. In fact, if rationalism is 
correct, computers using dialectic could be seen as 
higher creatures than humans because they operate 
through ideal truth; while we're forced to consider 
~~----"---"------------------------ -- _" ___ " __ _ 
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social aspects and pursue conclusions that might not be 
true, but desireable. 
But attempts to find these primitive truths have 
proven to be the downfall of both rationalism and the 
hopes of heuristic artificial intelligence for building 
a thinking computer. In the next section, we will move 
beyond the rationalist paradigm by considering reality 
and natural language as informally systemic parts of an 
informal reality. In seeing where rationalism's 
limitations exist, we can also see clearly where the 
limitations of computers using natural language exist. 
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PARALOGY AND COMPUTER FRAMEWORKS 
The primary concern in heuristic artificial 
intelligence research since the early 1970s has been 
natural language. Until the 1970s, heuristic 
researchers had viewed natural language as a secondary 
concern to the acquisition of cognitive abilities. 
They generally assumed that words and sentences take on 
simple forms that could be labeled and formalized to 
directly correspond to reality. However, with 
Winograd's SHRDLU project in the 1970s, the complexity 
of language became apparent as computers struggled to 
use even the simplest of linguistic forms (Winograd 
1976). Since then, natural language has become the 
dominant research area in heuristic artificial 
intelligence as researchers attempt to discover a way 
for their computers to use natural language 
effectively. And yet, before we ask "how" computers 
can be programmed to use natural language, we must 
first ask "whether" the rationalistic formal frameworks 
of computers are compatible with natural language. 
Considerations of rationalism were the basis on 
which Newell and Simon originally believed that 
computers could acquire and use thought. According to 
rationalism, as set forth by Plato's conception of 
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dialectics, natural language can be used to say things 
about the world that are inherently "true" or "false." 
Under this view of natural language, "content" words, 
such as nouns, verbs, adjectives, and adverbs, directly 
signify objects and concepts in the physical world 
(Winograd and Flores 1986). Observing similarities 
between computer frameworks and the rationalist 
conception of thought and natural language, Newell and 
Simon developed their Physical Symbol System 
hypothesis, citing Frege and Russell's attempts to 
formalize language into first order predicate calculus 
as their inspiration. They had correctly recognized 
that computers met the criteria of thought in 
rationalism in that these binary machines operate 
through a process of assigning truth or falseness to a 
statement and manipulating symbols (Newell 1980). 
Conspicuously missing in heuristic artificial 
intelligence's few discussions of philosophy, however, 
is a recognition that modern philosophy has identified 
the limitations of the rationalist paradigm. Many 
disciplines in the sciences and philosophy, once 
dominated by a strict reliance on rationalism and its 
conception of a deterministic reality, now have found 
evidence that reality is nQt formally systemic. 
-------------------------------- -·· ·--··-- -- ---· 
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So how does this anti-metaphysical philosophy allow 
us to approach studies of natural language? And 
further, where does heuristic artificial intelligence 
fit into a non-rationalist conception of reality and 
natural language? In this section, we will discuss the 
the evidence for an informal reality in the sciences 
and philosophy, then we will discuss the 
"post-structural" aspects of natural language and their 
effects on heuristic artificial intelligence. By 
viewing natural language as paralogical, we will 
discuss whether computers provide proper frameworks for 
the acquisition and usage of language. 
Paralogy as Opposed to System in Science and Logic 
To put it lightly, rationalism has dominated the 
thought and scientific theory of Western culture. As 
Winograd and Flores (1986) point out, rationalism has 
become synonymous with intelligence--
--as the paradigm of what it means to think and be 
intelligent. In studies of thought, emphasis is 
placed on the form of rules and on the nature of 
the processes by which they are logically applied. 
Areas of mathematics, such as symbolic logic and 
automata theory, are taken as the basis for 
formalizing what goes on when a person perceives, 
thinks, and acts. For someone trained in science 
and technology, it may seem self-evident that this 
is the right (or even the only) approach to 
serious thinking. Indeed, this is why many 
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workers in artificial intelligence find critiques 
like that of Dreyfus obviously wrong, since they 
challenge this deep-seated pre-understanding. 
Post-structuralist philosophers such as Derrida 
would even contend that this rationalist mind set is so 
deeply seeded in Western culture that breaking out of 
it is almost an impossible task (Derrida 1976). Kuhn, 
regarding scientific philosophy, argues that the 
rationalist paradigm restricts scientific growth 
because it encourages the sciences to be continually 
forcing observed phenomena into theories dominated by 
formal systemic rules (Kuhn 1970). 
Despite the long tradition of rationalism, however, 
science and philosophy in this century has found reason 
to doubt whether reality is indeed formally systemic. 
These doubts arise because the primitive elements that 
are essential to rationalism cannot be found. Instead, 
attempts to determine a formal structure in reality 
have led many philosophers and scientists to conclude 
that reality is actually paralogical, not formal 
systemic. By paralogical, I mean that the primitive 
elements or truths needed by rationalist philosophy to 
complete a formalization of reality don't exist; 
instead, we find that reality is based on uncertainty 
that defies exact deterministic formalism (Kent 1989). 
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Empiricism, in the Kantian tradition of 
rationalism, is based on the assumption that when we 
work through the scientific methods in analyzing 
reality, we are actually discovering the mathematical 
formalizations inherent in the universe. Recognizing 
that reality tends to operate through patterns, 
rationalism in science assumes that underneath each 
structure lies another structure until we arrived at 
the most basic structure. This primitive structure, 
upon which all reality is supposed to have been built, 
is assumed to be formal and codifiable into direct 
mathematical formulations. So in this light, science, 
especially since Kant, is understood by rationalists as 
the attempt to closer formalize reality until an exact 
formalization is discovered. 
However, attempts by both scientists and 
philosophers to isolate this basic structure have met 
with repeated failure. At the points at which 
scientists and philosophers expect basic structure, 
instead they find only uncertainty, paradox, and 
slipperyness. When the formal nature of rationalistic 
epistemology is deconstructed, we find that our 
universe is based on probabilistic uncertainty rather 
than primitive structures. To clarify this concept of 
-----------------------~ ~---~-
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paralogy, I have chosen two examples from other 
disciplines, physics and logic. 
Paralogy in physics 
As Richard Rorty points out, philosophy is split 
between philosophers that "have remained faithful to 
the Enlightenment and have continued to identify 
themselves with the cause of science" and philosophers 
that consider science to be "no more than the 
handmaiden of technology" (Rorty 1989). The first 
approach insists that science discovers truths by 
directly analyzing our surroundings. These truths are 
believed to actually exist in physical reality; and 
through their discovery, empiricists believe that 
reality can be systematized and formalized. The second 
philosophical approach sees natural science as a 
manufacturer of truths. Truth does not exist without 
the human mind because it is the human mind that 
determines what is true or not. At best, they believe, 
scientists can make generalizations about our 
surroundings, but these generalizations can never be 
held as absolutely true. 
Though most modern scientists, under the guiding 
hand of empiricism, work through the paradigm supported 
by the first approach to philosophy, we find that the 
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theories of modern physics encourage us to adopt the 
second approach to philosophy. Indeed, we have found 
that a formally systemic nature of physical reality 
does not exist at all. Instead, quantum physics has 
found that reality is paralogical. 
Paralogy in physics is best evidenced by quantum 
mechanic's reliance on Heisenberg's "uncertainty 
principle" in the treatment of matter's wave/particle 
duality. In quantum theory, matter from the smallest 
particle to the largest mass can be treated as both a 
wave or a particle in the same instances. Unlike 
classic Newtonian physics and Aristotle's metaphysics 
in which an inherent determinism in physical reality 
was an essential feature, the uncertainty principle 
specifies a sense of randomness in matter. Richard 
Feynman, a major American physicist, states the 
Heisenberg uncertainty principle as follows: 
If you make the measurement on any object, and you 
can determine the x-component of its momentum with 
an uncertainty dp, you cannot, at the same time, 
know its x-position more accurately than dx=h/dp, 
where h is a definite fixed number given by 
nature. It is called "Planck's constant" ... 
The uncertainties in position and momentum of a 
particle at any instant must have their product 
greater than Planck's constant (Feynrnan, Leighton, 
and Sands 1965). 
Put simply, the constant h always forces a paralogical 
gap between wave and particle, creating a sense of 
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"slipperiness" between momentum and position. The 
uncertainty principle ensures a paralogical gap between 
the treatment of matter as a wave (momentum) and the 
treatment of matter as a particle (position). 
Based on its need for a deterministic reality, 
rationalism would assume that at some point particle 
would become wave to create a "wavicle" in which both 
momentum and position could be measured simultaneously. 
However, quantum theory specifies a need for the two to 
be always separate (Tarozzi and van der Merwe 1988). 
The closer one determines position, the farther one is 
from specifying momentum; the closer one determines 
momentum, the farther one is from determining position. 
This uncertainty in physical reality is an example 
of the paralogical nature of physical reality. Our 
mathematical treatments of physics must be viewed as 
generalizations rather than strict formalizations of 
reality. Scientists even leave Schroedinger's 
equation, the essential formula of quantum theory to 
determine the energy states of particles, open to 
further additions, recognizing it as only an 
approximation to be continually improved by 
observation. 
Therefore, reality does not conform to formal 
mathematics and formulas; rather our mathematics and 
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formulas only approximate the actions of reality. This 
uncertainty in physics shows us that formalization (and 
thus rationalism) fails to do anything more than 
generalize about the actions of physical reality. We 
find that physical reality is indeterminate; therefore 
it denies formal systemization. 
Paralogy in logic 
Logicians encountered paralogy as they strove to 
determine the elements of human reasoning. 
Aristotleian dialectics, the foundational basis for 
logic, specifies that logic contains two branches of 
reasoning, deduction and induction. Deduction, 
represented by the syllogism, rests on the assumption 
that two "known truths" can be used to derive a sound 
conclusion. Induction bases the proof of a proposition 
on an ideally infinite number of similar cases 
(Bergmann 1980). Aristotle and his rationalist heirs 
viewed induction as a form of logic to be used in cases 
where truths were not readily available for syllogistic 
reasoning. 
In dialectics, syllogistic reasoning requires an 
eventual identification of indisputable knowns to 
complete sound logical formalization of reality. In 
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Aristotle's dialectics, these primitive elements needed 
to exist in his conception of a codifiable universe. 
However, rationalists' attempts to identify these 
knowns have continually failed throughout history. 
Bertrand Russell states: 
It appreared that, from premisses which all 
logicians of no matter what school had accepted 
ever since the time of Aristotle, contradictions 
could be deduced, showing that something was amiss 
but giving no indication as to how matters were to 
be put right (Russell 1959). 
Gottlieb Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Ludwig 
Wittgenstein worked diligently to resolve these 
"contradictions" that undermined rationalist logic's 
conception of a formally systemic reality. Russell in 
correspondence with Frege said that "Frege was so 
disturbed by this contradiction that he gave up the 
attempt to deduce arithmetic from logic, to which, 
until then his life had mainly been devoted" 
(Russell 1959). Russell, who claimed that one of his 
three goals in life was to "persuade myself that 
something could be known," repeatedly met with paradox 
where he felt knowns should be found (Russell 1959). 
Wittgenstein, after spending years searching for 
primitive elements, abandoned rationalism and instead 
turned to attack it. In 1953, he published his 
Philisophical Investigations, an outright attack on his 
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own Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. In Philisophical 
Investigations he argued that reasoning and language 
can't be context-free from human interpretation as a 
rationalistic conception of formal systemic reality 
would contend; they require some form of pragmatic 
organization in which our experience in coping with 
everday problems is incorporated. Wittgenstein states: 
Both Russell's 'individuals' and my 'objects' were 
such primary elements. But what are the simple 
constituent parts of which reality is 
composed?--The bits of wood of which it is made? 
Or the molecules, or the atoms? Simple means: not 
composite. And here the point is: in what sense 
'composite'? It makes no sense at all to speak 
absolutely of the 'simple parts of a chair' 
(Wittgenstein 1953). 
He later states that: 
To the philosophical question: "Is the visual 
image of this tree composite, and what are its 
component parts?" the correct answer is: "That 
depends on what you understand by 'composite'." 
(And that of course is not an answer but a 
rejection of the question.) (Wittgenstein 1953). 
Rationalism in logic found itself in the same 
situation as physics. Reality could not be formally 
systemetized because primitive truths or knowns could 
not be identified. In the case of physics, 
uncertainty, not formal system, was found at the basis 
of physical reality; meanwhile, in logic, paradox, not 
formal system, was found at the basis of human 
reasoning. 
------------------------------------------------------------- --------
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These two field's discoveries are similar in that 
they example the paralogical nature of reality. 
Reality is not formally systemic at its roots; rather, 
it is indeterminate and paralogical. Our 
formalizations of reality, therefore, are based on 
assumptions, allowing us to accept them as nothing more 
than approximations and generalizations of our 
surroundings. 
Society and Language 
Considering that scientists and philosophers have 
shown other parts of reality to be paralogical, can we 
accept rationalism's assumption that natural language 
is formally systemic? Though our prescriptive grammar 
books attempt to lay down specific rules about the 
"right" and "wrong" of natural language usage, language 
is hardly a static feature in human society. Rather, 
it is a fluid medium that continually changes over 
time. Despite these constant changes, however, natural 
languages tend to settle down into common syntactic 
patterns that sentences generally follow. In English, 
the general pattern is subject, verb, object (SVO). 
Linguists in the last century, following the cues of 
empiricism, have often looked at these patterns as an 
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indication of some form of "deep structure" that 
underlies all language forms. 
Despite the empirically based assertions of the 
formal nature of natural language, though, do we really 
have any reason to believe that language must be 
formally systemic? Or is this a case, as Heidegger and 
Derrida assert, where the rationalist paradigm and its 
insistence on formal system is restricting us from 
understanding natural language in other more pragmatic 
ways? (Derrida 1976, Heidegger 1962) 
First we'll consider the position of rationalism. 
Rationalism insists that language must be viewed as a 
formally systemic process that is universal in reality. 
Plato originally argued that the primitives of lan~uage 
are inherent in humans because they are brought from a 
past life. Aristotle tried to codify these formally 
systemic features in his Dialectics, but then wrote his 
Rbetoric as a recognition that this formal system was 
not in actual us~ in social interactions (Kennedy 
1980). He, and rationalists since, have viewed the 
deviances from the "ideal" system of language as 
pragmatic taintings of the formal rules that supposedly 
exist in reality. The rationalist views language as a 
strict systemic process in which the universal rules 
can be formalized into logical structures. 
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This view of a formal systemic language, though, 
has not been supported by philosophical inquiry into 
natural language in the twentieth century. When 
rationalists, Frege and Russell, tried to identify 
formal language in terms of dialectical analysis, their 
attempts to develop language in the form of first order 
predicate calculus failed. Their research actually 
drew a very different conclusion than their atomist 
upbringing had taught them to expect. Attempting to 
isolate the primitive elements or "truths" that were 
necessary for a formal systemic language, their efforts 
only found paradox where they thought primitive 
elements would be discovered (Russell 1959). Language, 
as they found, could not be formalized because the 
elements necessary for such a formal system could not 
be isolated. Wittgenstein, whose own attempts to 
isolate the primitive elements of language also failed, 
took these failures as an indication that the primitive 
elements of reality do not exist (Wittgenstein 1953). 
Natural language as Wittgenstein concluded and 
Rorty later confirmed is paralogical much like physics 
and logic (Rorty 1989). The observance of pattern 
qualities of languages does not necessarily indicate 
that a formal system is underneath the language guiding 
it and unifying it. 
------------
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Now just because no formal system underlies 
language does not imply that language has no structure, 
or, for that matter, that it is not a system. On the 
contrary, natural language follows definite patterns 
and conventions of the social groups that generate and 
use it (Halliday and Hasan 1989). The problem with the 
rationalist conception of formal system in natural 
language is that it ascribes to those conventions a 
strictly ruled quality in which language supposedly 
conforms to mathematical formulations. Formalized 
natural language supports the false notion that 
language is static, context-free, and not socially 
dependent. 
Rather than a formal system, natural language is an 
informal system with a structure that is as 
indeterminate as the societies that generate and use it 
(Halliday and Hasan 1989). Like physics with its 
generalizations of physical reality into formulas, 
linguistic formal analyses of natural language are only 
generalizations, not direct taps into truth. So we 
need to approach them as such. We need to always 
remember that natural language conventions in a society 
can be looked at separate from that society, but we 
cannot deceive ourselves into believing that natural 
language can be extracted and formalized without ties 
81 
to its social environments. In other words, as a 
socio-semiotician like Halliday would point out: 
.. we cannot operate with the concept of a sign 
as an entity. We have to think rather of systems 
of meaning, systems that may be considered as 
operating through some external form of output 
that we call a sign, but that are in themselves 
not sets of individual things, but rather networks 
of relationships. It is in that sense that I 
would use the term 'semiotic' to define the 
perspective in which we want to look at language: 
language as one among a number of systems of 
meaning that, taken all together, constitute human 
culture. 
For some linguists (e.g., Chomsky 1957; Lamb 1966) 
the preferred mode of interpretation is the 
psychological one, in which language is to be 
explained in terms of the processes of the human 
mind or the human brain ... For us, then, the 
perspective primarily adopted--not to the 
exclusion of the others, but because this is where 
we look first to seek our explanations for 
linguistic phenomena--is a social one. We attempt 
to relate language primarily to one particular 
aspect of human experience, namely that of social 
structure (Halliday and Hasan 1989). 
One can look at language conventions without their 
society and even attempt to formalize them as Chomsky 
has done in Transformational Grammar; but one must also 
recognize that those formalizations as in physics are 
only generalizations because the lack of primitive 
elements forces natural language to be paralogical. 
One must also recognize that all languages are 
essentially dependent on their social environments and 
cannot be extracted totally from them. 
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Paralogy in Meaning and Computers 
At this point, we will turn to the more practical 
matters of language in artificial intelligence to show 
where the paralogical nature of language will cause 
insurmountable barriers to heuristic artificial 
intelligence. Despite the assertion that computers 
provide an improper framework for natural language, 
most people have encountered computers that can "speak" 
audibly or use written words as prompts on a moniter. 
For instance, the cash register at the local 
supermarket might read and sound out prices; a car 
signals in words that one of the doors is ajar; or an 
electronic game for the television guides the player 
verbally. Most software programs these days provide 
specific prompts that tell the users what information 
is needed for the next step. Indeed, many computers on 
the market have the ability to signal a human through 
verbal or written words. In comparison with what 
humans accomplish with language, though, we wouldn't 
consider these computers "intelligent;" but they are 
using words. 
When we speak of using language, more is expected 
than the ability to manipulate words. Language is a 
socially interactive medium in which thought is 
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expressed through symbols. The ability to manipulate 
these symbols, though, is not sufficient evidence to 
claim any sense of "intelligence." Of course, the 
point being driven at is that the ability to use 
language requires an ability to accomplish more than 
the symbolic manipulations of speech and written text; 
an ability to correspond real semantic meaning to 
symbols is also essential. 
As discussed in the previous chapters, however, 
computers are purely symbolic machines with no 
conception of the real meaning of words. While human 
beings can experience the meaning behind a word and 
gain a semantic understanding, computers must rely on 
their programmers to formalize definitions and contexts 
in which each word is used. According to rationalism, 
this approach to language would require a great 
expended effort, but it would be possible. But if we 
are to accept language as paralogical, such 
formalizations are impossible. 
First, let us consider definitions of words. 
Newell and Simon originally hypothesized that the brain 
operates by manipulating physical symbols. These 
symbols, following the rationalist conception of 
reality, reflected directly real objects in reality. 
Rationalism asserts that a direct connection between 
------------------------------------------
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symbol and meaning, syntax and semantics exists. This 
issue was put down directly by Montague's homomorphism 
between syntax and semantics: 
1. For each syntactic category there is a 
corresponding semantic object. 
2. For each syntactic operation there is a 
corresponding semantic operation. 
(Hausser 1989) 
So if a computer could properly manipulate the syntax 
of a language, it would also be manipulating the 
semantics of those symbols also, since symbol and 
meaning were directly connected. If we look through 
the eyes of rationalism, at some point, syntax and 
semantics should connect to form a point of 
syntax/semantics. 
In post-structuralism, however, the connection 
between word and symbol is much looser and slippery, 
making definitions impossible to formalize into 
primitives or referents. For example, let us consider 
the problem with formalizing a set of referents for the 
word "car." We start by looking in the dictionary and 
thesaurus for definitions: 
Dictionary: 
Car: 1. An automobile. 
2. Any of various wheeled vehicles. 
3. The enclosed platform of an elevator. 
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Thesaurus: 
Car: 1. auto 
2. motor (car) 
3. automotive vehicle 
Obviously, each of these definitions rely on other 
symbols that need to be defined with referents 
themselves. So we look up the meanings of the other 
words and find more undefined words. Eventually we 
have a huge collection of descriptions of cars, types 
of cars, purposes for cars, etc. But still, we find 
that our abstractions are built on other abstractions, 
without any solid conception of what the symbol "car" 
really represents. Just the number referents needed to 
clearly define the one basic symbol "car" grows quickly 
to a staggering amount. 
Realizing that the dictionary is leading us more 
into abstraction than specificity, we all sit down with 
a piece of paper and start defining what the symbol 
"car" means to each of us. Soon it becomes apparent 
that though we cAn all generally agree on what a car 
is, we all have different, often opposite meanings for 
the word. One person who has experienced a great 
amount of engine trouble has a negative tinge to his 
meaning of "car;" while another person who always saw 
her car as a symbol of freedom has a completely 
different meaning for the word. Soon, other 
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associations start to take their place in the meaning 
of the symbol "car:" car sickness, family vacations, 
driving to college, etc. Once again we have found that 
the specificity needed to formalize meaning into 
referents for a word only leads us into abstraction. 
Of course, the problem I'm driving at is that 
semantics cannot be effectively formalized into 
referents and primitives as heuristic researchers 
believe. Most heuristic research today attempts to 
assign referents of meaning to symbols to give 
computers some sort of semantic ability. Schank argues 
for primitives of natural language upon which all 
meaning is built (Schank 1975). And yet, as Russell, 
Frege, and Wittgenstein already found, those primitives 
do not exist. From the car example, we see that 
meaning for a symbol is reliant on many idiosyncratic 
and social contextual associations that are beyond the 
capabilities of a computer to acquire. So what the 
heuristic branch is left with is a relatively 
simplistic synthetic conception of meaning when 
compared to a human's sense of meaning. Whereas a car 
might be a [+vehicle], [+four wheels], [-animal], 
[+animate], etc. (as far as the programmer wishes to 
go) to the computer, it is infinitely much more to a 
human being. 
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We have found that like other aspects of reality, 
language too is paralogical. As in the wave/particle 
aspect of quantum physics, a paralogical gap separates 
symbol from meaning. Derrida developed the concept of 
this separation in his works on differance (Derrida 
1976). Language, he explained, associates semantic 
meaning with symbol; but when one attempts to isolate 
the meaning of a symbol, it becomes slippery and 
playful. Like the wave and particle, meaning and 
symbol are inseparably joined, but never directly 
connected as in rationalism. 
So natural language cannot be separated from a 
society and an individual's idiosyncratic experiences 
(Halliday and Hasan 1989). The forms that are agreed 
on by the sciences of language shouldn't be mistaken 
for universal truths or formal system that underlies 
natural language. Rather, we need to see natural 
language formalizations as only generalizations. 
Synthetic Language 
The crux of the problem for computers with natural 
language is that they are not compatible systems. 
Computers are formal systems. They need information 
synthesized into primitive elements and formal 
---------------- ---~-~ ~--~ -- ~ 
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heuristics. Mathematics works fine with computers 
because it has been developed as an ideal formal system 
in which elements and formulas are available. 
Mathematics doesn't generalize about the real-world; 
rather, it builds itself from its own paradigm. 
Natural language, however, is part of a paralogical 
reality and does not rely on formal system. Therefore 
computers with their restrictive rationalist frameworks 
will never be able to use natural language as humans 
do. 
The anticipated argument to the conclusion that 
natural language is not a formal system and therefore 
incompatible with a computer's framework is that 
linguistics can generalize so well that a quasi-natural 
language can be developed that fits the computer 
framework. These arguments come from those 
self-proclaimed "weak" heuristic researchers who feel 
that a formal system's representation of natural 
language is sufficient for language use. 
Their argument, derived from a rationalistic view 
of language, is that questions of real meaning are far 
less relevant if the computer can outwardly simulate 
intelligence (Smith 1988, Rapaport 1988). They would 
argue for the use of a synthetic representation of 
language that is formally systemic and purely symbolic. 
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Really, the reason heuristic researchers like Rapaport 
advance such synthetic forms of natural language is 
because these restrictions on reality are what it would 
take to graft a sense of natural language onto a 
computer framework. Heuristic artificial 
intelligence's only chance of success is for it to shut 
its eyes from research in language and to attempt to 
restrict language to fit their computers. 
Besides the obvious difficulty of fabricating a 
language in denial of how natural language actually 
works, some rather basic problems immediately confront 
this approach to artificial intelligence. For one 
thing, the computer, as Searle pointed out, cannot 
think because it has no real semantic abilities. 
Second, the computer cannot use language syntactically 
correctly because natural language, as I've pointed out 
above, cannot be totally formalized and no "correct" 
exists. 
We've seen the results of attempts to synthesize 
language: programmers trying to develop endless 
parsing schemes to anticipate the many sentence 
structures that humans use; computer databases choked 
with referents for even the most restricted semantic 
abilities; computer programs with a few behavior 
scripts struggling to accomplish tasks that humans 
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don't even think twice about. Heuristic artificial 
intelligence through much expended effort, time, and 
money has developed simplistic programs that cannot 
come close to communicating effectively with humans. 
A rule of carpentry is that one should always use 
the correct tool for a task because using the 
convenient wrong tool usually ends up causing more work 
with bad results. We have such a situation with 
heuristic artificial intelligence. Computers are the 
wrong tool for thought and natural language; yet, 
heuristic researchers have stubbornly insisted on 
forcing thought and natural language into computer 
frameworks with bad results. 
Conclusion 
In this section we discussed the paralogical 
aspects of natural language and showed how they provide 
an insurmountable barrier to heuristic artificial 
intelligence. Language, like other aspects of reality, 
is anti-metaphysical in that it has no formal system 
underneath that can be codified. Therefore, since 
computers ~ a formal system language to be 
programmed into their memory, we have two choices. 
Either we can satisfy ourselves with pursuing synthetic 
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formalizations of language that won't ever provide 
effective communication in social environments; or we 
can recognize the computer as an incompatible framework 
for artificial intelligence and set it aside. 
The next section will discuss a different approach 
to natural language through rhetoric. Rhetoric, as a 
pragmatic use of natural language, can provide guidance 
as to what type of machine could use natural language 
effectively without forcing research to settle on a 
synthetic formalization of language that conveniently 
fits computer frameworks. 
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PRAGMATICS AND RHETORIC 
To this point, our discussion has primarily 
centered on the theory, philosophical position, and 
capabilities of computers to acquire and use natural 
language. As the technological product of applied 
theories of rationalism, computers are shackled by the 
same difficulties and restrictions that face all 
research done through the rationalist paradigm. As in 
physics, logic, and linguistics, formal analyses in 
artificial intelligence only allow a simplistic, 
restrictive concept of natural language that is 
inadequate for pragmatic use in social environments. 
Does this mean that computers cannot use language? 
Yes and no. Obviously, one cannot deny that the 
programs such as ELIZA, SHRDLU, and CYRUS have shown an 
ability to recognize input and respond to inputted 
information with relevant answers. Schank's work with 
language has provided some practical applications in 
the growing field of expert system software. Winograd, 
though soundly proving that computers cannot be 
artificially intelligent, encourages research to look 
for the many potential applications of computers using 
natural language in helping humans accomplish tasks 
better. Obviously computers that can parse sentences 
--------------- ~ ---~--
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and correspond in a user's language would be valuable 
due to their accessibility. 
An important point to remember, however, is that 
the formal hardware of computers will always serve as a 
restriction to their ability to successfully use 
natural language as humans can. As programmers try to 
further formalize natural language and human behavior 
into heuristics, a point will always exist at which the 
limits of their computers, their patience, or their 
lifespans will force them to recognize that a 
universally adept computer in natural language isn't 
feasible. And for what will all their time, genius, 
and money have gone for? A computer that can carry on 
a simplistic conversation in English? Even if we did 
have powerful enough hardware, the complexity of 
natural language would force most of the computers' 
efforts to be spent on communication, not the problem-
solving applications for which they could be most 
useful. 
Continually awed by the powers of the human brain, 
I can't help but think that perhaps a better approach 
could be taken toward artificial intelligence. Indeed, 
the mindset that computers are the answer to artificial 
intelligence has turned into a restrictive paradigm 
that seems to be holding back research in the 
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discipline from looking for better machines on which to 
build artificial intelligence. Researchers like 
Winograd who have allowed themselves to step out of the 
paradigm have often found that a view from the outside 
shows clearly how strictly confining computers can be 
to research in artificial intelligence. The problem 
with the discipline of artificial intelligence is that 
researchers are asking how natural language fits their 
computers rather than asking the more relevant question 
of what type of machine is needed to acquire and use 
natural language. Therefore, the restrictive hardware 
of computers is forcing researchers to approach the 
problem from the wrong direction. 
So at this point in the text, we will set computers 
aside. Surely, there remain many amazing applications 
for them in the future, but artificial intelligence as 
a pursuit of a thinking machine is not one of them. 
With the rest of this text, we will approach the 
discipline from a new angle. Instead of prematurely 
settling on a machine, we will look at what the 
features of natural language tell us about the types 
machines that would be able to use language. Of 
course, our focus turns from computer science to the 
humanities as we need to find out what humans do with 
95 
natural language. In this way, we can determine also 
what our machines need to do with natural language. 
In this section, we will discuss the pragmatic 
aspects of natural language through considerations of 
the purposes and uses of rhetorical discourse. Though 
certainly not the only angle we can take toward this 
search for a proper machine hardware for artificial 
intelligence, rhetoric provides an excellent example of 
discourse processes in use in social contexts. By 
allowing established fields such as rhetoric to mentor 
research in artificial intelligence, our research can 
go beyond the mindset that forces research to focus on 
parsing sentences and writing relatively simple 
heuristics of human behavior. Instead, we can 
understand directly what we want our machines to 
accomplish with natural language in social contexts. 
Rhetorical Ability as a Needed Quality 
Rhetoric as defined by Aristotle is "the faculty of 
observing in any given case the available means of 
persuasion. Referring back to Turing's Imitation 
Game, we can see rather simply that rhetoric is a skill 
that any artificially intelligent machine would need to 
have to pass the test. The machine needs to persuade 
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humans that it too is a human being. So for successful 
operation as an intelligent entity, the machine needs 
to have the ability to find the proper means of 
persuasion to successfully convince a small social 
group that it is human. 
At first, this might sound like a solution to an 
isolated case, but rhetorical discourse is a prevelant 
part of almost all uses of natural language. Whether 
we are writing out a grocery list, discussing a movie 
with a friend, or speaking in public, we are to some 
degree attempting to persuade members in our social 
environment to act or believe something that we wish 
them to consider "correct." When communicating through 
natural language, humans are in essence always 
rhetorically persuading others in their social groups 
to accept a particularly ideisyncratic view of reality 
(Rorty 1989). 
Certainly, many artificial intelligence researchers 
who are used to approaching natural language textually 
through grammar features of sentences will find this 
approach from rhetoric to be reaching too far too 
quickly. No doubt, they will point out that this 
approach is too sophisticated when we haven't even 
established the "basics" of natural language use. But 
what are the "basics" of natural language? Afterall, 
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children learn to use rhetoric long before they learn 
how to put words and phrases together. A human baby's 
first acts involve rhetoric: they cry when they're 
hungry, they smile because it nets them attention, they 
fidget when they feel neglected. Essentially, humans 
learn at a very young age to persuade the members in 
their social environments (mom and dad) to do what they 
want. Rhetoric isn't necessarily among the 
sophisticated aspects of language; rather, it is among 
the first things we learn as human beings. 
Language as a Social Act 
Instead of formalizing the conventions of language, 
rhetoric allows research in artificial intelligence to 
approach natural language more properly as a social 
construction. Due to its paralogical nature, natural 
language represents a social generalization rather than 
a direct reflection of a truth that is "out there." 
Informally systemic like the social groups that use it, 
natural language expresses and promotes the user 
society's interpretations of reality (Rorty 1989). 
Therefore, a contextual understanding of natural 
language within the social group that uses it is 
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essential to proper acquisition and usage (Halliday and 
Hasan 1989). 
Actually, social groups can consitute any grouping 
of people that communicates ideas among its members 
with a form of natural language. On a larger level, 
"English speaking people" represents a social group 
because it shares commonality through a class of 
natural language. On a smaller level, "doctors in 
Iowa" represents a social group because it shares 
commonality in language that requires contextual 
understanding in medicinal practices in Iowa. Humans 
operate effectively in those social groups in which the 
conventions of language that allow a member to 
communicate are understood. Therefore, natural 
language users must understand the contexts as well as 
the textual conventions of the societies in which they 
wish to operate (Halliday and Hasan 1989). 
This need for social context in addition to textual 
abilities in successful natural language acquisition 
and usage provides an important distinction between 
informal, pragmatic theories of natural language and 
the formalistic theories of rationalism. In 
rationalism, natural language and truth can be 
essentially separated from their social context due to 
their supposed formally systemic nature. Language and 
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truth as mirrors of the formal reality are therefore 
thought by rationalists to contain a codifiable truth 
that can be "found" through empirical inquiry outside 
of social context. This believed direct attachment to 
reality through language and truth accounts for the 
rationalists' assumption that primitives of reality 
exist to be discovered. 
Generally viewing language as a socially generated 
medium used to understand reality, pragmatic, social 
theories of language locate truth within the accepted 
beliefs of social groups. Therefore, truth is "made" 
by social groups rather than "found" in reality (Rorty 
1989). At first, this conception of truth as a social 
construction often makes persons brought up under the 
rationalist paradigm uneasy because it advocates that 
the "discoveries" made by science are only more useful 
manufactured generalizations of reality (Kuhn 1970). 
Due to the paralogical nature of reality in which 
formalizations of reality are impossible, though, 
theories must be recognized only as useful 
generalizations of our physical and social 
environments. 
Identified within the context of a social 
environment, truth becomes informal and without 
absolutes, not conforming to any universal guidelines. 
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Lamenting that, despite the success of rationalism, as 
a theory it had been unable to determine an 
indisputable "truth" in reality, Kant called it "a 
scandal of philosophy and of human reason in general" 
that Western philosophy had not been able to answer the 
question "How can I know whether anything outside of my 
subjective consciousness exists?" Heidegger points out 
that "the 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this 
proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are 
expected and attempted again and again" (Heidegger 
1962). 
With this conception of language as an informal 
system generated and used by social groups, natural 
language must be viewed as inseparably intertwined with 
the social groups that use it. Natural language is 
acquired through interaction with social groups and is 
used within social contexts. Rorty claims that "truth 
is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences." 
Therefore, the ability to correspond in natural 
language with social groups and their interpretations 
of reality is an essential feature of an intelligent 
entity. 
With the placement of truth within the beliefs of 
social groups, the importance of rhetoric to the use of 
natural language becomes clearer. As a medium of 
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persuasion of socially generated versions of truth, 
rhetorical discourse represents the way in which 
language-using members of a social group help generate 
and promote their social group's conception of truth. 
Therefore, a machine's ability to acquire natural 
language hinges on its ability to learn from and 
correspond pragmatically with the social groups in 
which it is meant to operate. 
As a side note, I find it ironic in a rationalistic 
field like heuristic artificial intelligence, where 
truth supposedly can be codified into primitives, that 
the test of intelligence is to have the computer 
persuade humans that a falsehood is true--the computer 
is human. If one accepts that such primitives of truth 
exist, one can't accept that lies are available to the 
computer since all its concepts are dialectically built 
on truth. 
Pragmatism in Artificial Intelligence 
Rhetoric, by understanding natural language 
acquisition and usage as socially dependent, allows us 
to approach natural language pragmatically instead of 
empirically. Therefore, our approaches to artificial 
intelligence change to reflect a more functional 
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purpose for natural language. Instead of searching for 
or synthesizing underlying structure, we can instead 
focus on how language is acquired by the members of 
societies that generate it. Humans don't acquire 
natural language usage through an initial understanding 
of the features of language. Rather, humans learn 
natural language by recognizing patterns in discourse, 
allowing the guiding hand of social context to help 
infants to self-organize the principles of natural 
language within their own minds. 
Actually, Rosenblatt, the first major figure in 
connectionist artificial intelligence, was the first to 
advocate this approach to developing human reasoning in 
a machine. Though he didn't argue against rationalism 
in artificial intelligence as I have done, he did 
recognize that formalizing human reasoning processes 
would be extremely complicated. Instead, he advocated 
an approach in which machines would be built to 
recognize and associate patterns in their experiences 
(Rosenblatt 1962). Approaching questions of 
intelligence with the human mind as a model, he felt 
that machines could be built that would be able to 
organize their own experiences into patterns. This 
practice would eliminate the need, as in heuristic 
artificial intelligence, for researchers to formalize 
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or synthesize human reasoning outside of the machine. 
Self-organizing machines would form their own 
generalizations about their experiences and associate 
these experiences with one another through recognition 
of similarities. Researchers in this approach wouldn't 
even need to understand why or how the machine 
organized its experiences, eliminating the 
complications involved with formalized programming. 
Rosenblatt's research showed us that pattern 
recognizing machines are possibilities. They don't 
need researchers to program them to recognize specific 
patterns, only how to associate patterns within 
different stimulus. In other words, the pattern 
recognition approach would treat learning by the 
machine much as we treat learning in humans in that it 
would allow machines to organize their own patterns of 
"thought" from the material that they are "taught." 
If we extend Rosenblatt's concept of 
self-organization to language acquisition, we can see 
that pattern recognition is the best way to develop 
language capabilities in artificially intelligent 
machines. Natural language as we've discussed is a 
socially generated medium that members learn through 
social interaction. Humans didn't acquire language by 
having someone or something sit them down and point out 
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that "this is classified as a noun and it goes here in 
a sentence." Rather, in correspondence with their 
immediate social groups, they learn to distinguish 
patterns in social discourse and associate those with 
other language patterns they had experienced before. 
Once enough of these patterns are accumulated, 
children attempt to join the discourse of their 
immediate community. Of course, with a limited 
exposure to patterns and the small society with which 
they have contact (parents, family members) they start 
out with something like "mama·· or ''dada," but this was 
relevant communication in those social groups all the 
same. All through life, when humans fail to 
communicate according to the expectations of their 
social groups, the social group affected corrects them 
with proper patterns. In all societies, including 
academic ones, this correction is an important aspect 
of gaining and organizing knowledge. When a member 
advocates a new conception of truth, societies will 
either correct that member to fit the accepted 
conception of truth or they will accept that conception 
of truth and change their own. Likewise, when a 
machine makes a socially incorrect association between 
meanings, the society can correct it with the proper 
course of action. 
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This concept of the self-organization of language 
through social interaction presents a superior 
alternative to formalization of human language 
processes for artificial intelligence. First, it 
recognizes that language cannot be formalized due to 
its paralogical nature, eliminating the need for a 
tedious synthesis of language by programmers. The 
machine acts like a human in that it self-organizes its 
language by distinguishing similar patterns and 
constantly improving its language competence. Second, 
it allows the machine to learn the conventions, 
patterns, and discourse in its social environments, 
allowing the machine to communicate through the 
concepts of truth that its social groups have 
manufactured. 
Conclusion 
In this section, the argument was made that a 
pragmatic understanding of natural language can help 
guide research in artificial intelligence. By asking 
what type of machine is compatible with natural 
language rather than asking how natural language can be 
made compatible with computers, we are able to approach 
the discipline of artificial intelligence from a new 
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angle. Rhetoric as a pragmatic understanding of 
language can provide that approach. 
Since at one point or another theory needs to touch 
base with application in artificial intelligence, the 
next section will provide some practical guidance from 
rhetoric for the type of machine that can achieve 
artificial intelligence. Some artificial intelligence 
researchers familiar with the current dilemmas and 
roadblocks facing artificial intelligence will probably 
find it interesting that rhetoric has researched and 
often overcome some very similar problems. For 
researchers in the humanities, the next section might 
provide a bridge through which they can find ways in 
which their work can likewise offer guidance to 
research in artificial intelligence. 
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RHETORICAL NEEDS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
In the last section, the argument was made that 
when we want our artificially intelligent machines to 
communicate with natural language, we want them to use 
language rhetorically. In comparison to the relatively 
young field of artificial intelligence, rhetoric is a 
matured discipline with a long history of established 
analysis and practical achievements. Though we often 
seem to assume that our age represents the highest 
achievement in academic pursuits, in studies of 
language we increasingly find ourselves returning to 
theories developed in ancient Greece and Rome to 
understand how natural language operates in social 
environments. 
Presently in the philosophy of language, the 
discipline of rhetoric is undergoing a change similar 
to that in artificial intelligence. Through the ideas 
of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Rorty, Derrida, Grice, 
Searle, among many others, the philosophy of language 
has challenged the rationalist paradigm of formalism 
that has dominated and often restricted the directions 
of research in natural language. Commonly labled 
"post-structuralism" to separate them from the 
rationalist paradigm that came before them, these 
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theories advocate an anti-metaphysical, decentered, and 
paralogical understanding of reality and natural 
language. They approach language as a pragmatic 
activity that cannot be codified into formalisms (Rorty 
1989). 
Like most studies in western culture, rhetoric too 
has been dominated by rationalism's insistence of 
formal system. We can trace the basis of formally 
systemic rhetoric to Plato and Aristotle's arguments 
against the pragmatic rhetorics of the sophists (Kent 
1989). The sophists, best represented by Antiphon, 
Gorgias, !socrates, and Protagoras, treated discourse 
as a social instrument for use in the daily activities 
of Greek legal, social, and political life. 
For Plato, this kind of pragmatic approach to 
discourse obviously posed a direct threat to his 
entire metaphysics, and for Aristotle, Sophistic 
materialism lead directly to an untenable 
relativism that threatened the foundation of his 
categories . . . . For epistemological 
foundationalism and a metaphysics of presence to 
endure, Sophistic philosophy, which consisted of 
rhetoric in its practical uses, had to be 
eradicated, and for the most part it was (Kent 
1989). 
Despite our inability to regain the sophistic position 
with regards to language, we find that 
post-structuralism in both linguitics and the 
philosophy of language is advocating a return to 
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understanding natural language as a pragmatic, 
contextual medium. 
-----------~ 
However, looking at the works that form the 
framework of classical rhetoric such as those of 
!socrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintillian, we might 
even say that rhetoric has never completely fallen into 
the rationalist paradigm. For example, despite the 
insistence on formal system in all of his publicly 
circulated works, Aristotle's Rhetoric, from which most 
of our analogies to artificial intelligence will be 
made, has a touch of sophistic influence in it due to 
his recognition that social interactions generally defy 
formalization (Kennedy 1980). Therefore, though it 
could be identified in the rationalist paradigm due to 
its author, the Rhetoric can also be useful due to its 
excellent analysis of the informal nature of natural 
language usage. Aristotle never released his rhetoric 
to the public, but rather used it in teaching as a 
work-in-progress. There has been speculation that his 
reluctance to circulate the text was due to his 
inability to tie the informal qualities of rhetoric 
into his formal conception of metaphysics (Kennedy 
1980). 
In this section, we will discuss the parallels 
between rhetoric and natural language in artificial 
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intelligence. The problem usually found with most 
critical work from the human sciences and humanities is 
that their authors say what is wrong with artificial 
intelligence but don't contribute a solution or 
guidance. In light of the previous arguments of this 
text, however, this section will provide a few 
parallels between rhetoric and artificial intelligence 
to help guide new directions of research into 
artificial intelligence. 
Do these parallels mean that rhetoric has the 
answers to artificial intelligence? Thankfully, no. 
Do they show that that rhetoric has more relevance to 
artificial intelligence than other fields in the 
humanities? Not really. But analyses such as this one 
from research in the humanities do show that such 
research directions are both proper and warranted. 
Because the humanities study what constitutes 
intelligent behavior by humans, they can serve as 
mentors toward developing the type of machine that can 
achieve artificial intelligence. 
Informal System and Rhetorical Probabalities 
Rhetorical discourse, unlike dialectical discourse, 
relies heavily on probabilities. Even Aristotle, a 
111 
strong advocate of deterministic metaphysics, 
recognized that absolute truth is often unattainable 
(and often not desired) in social environments. Unlike 
in dialectic, where truth is an inherent feature of 
reality based on supposed primitive truths, truth in 
rhetoric relies on what a social group comes to 
perceive as "true." Therefore, the purpose of 
discourse is not to discover absolute truth but to 
persuade the other members in a social group that a 
conception of truth is probably true. We have an 
example of rhetorical probabilities from Plato's 
Phaedrus: 
Socrates: If a weak and brave man, having beaten 
up a strong and cowardly man, is brought into 
court, neither must tell the truth. The coward 
must claim to have been attacked by two or more, 
whereas the other must refute this, insisting that 
the two of them were alone, in order to use the 
argument "how could a little one like me have 
attacked a big one like him?" (273b4-cl) 
Rhetorical arguments and pragmatic discourse as a 
whole, as this example shows, do not rely on absolute 
truth or falseness but rather relies on a sense of 
"maybe" that leans toward but never reaches the 
absolute poles. 
Considering reality as paralogical (primitive, 
absolute truths do not exist), all aspects of human 
discourse can be viewed as rhetorical with a focus on 
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probabilities. Since absolute truth is unavailable, 
discourse is based on the agreement of a social group 
that something is probably true (Rorty 1989). We can't 
pin down a concept and say "X is absolutely true;" 
rather, social groups agree that "X is probably true." 
Therefore, truth is a matter of social persuasion and 
rhetoric represents the discourse means through which 
social groups manufacture and agree on what will be 
held as true. 
Quite the opposite of rhetoric-using humans, 
computers as dialectic, deductive machines need items 
synthesized into elements of absolute truth (1) and 
falseness (0). For this reason, even on a macro-level, 
the computer cannot reason in terms of probabilities; 
either something is absolutely true or not. Where this 
aspect of formal strictness causes problems is in a 
situation such as the Imitation Game in which the 
computer needs to act rhetorically through persuasion. 
Here, the machine is not arguing from absolute truth 
(it's lying), but it is attempting to persuade the 
humans of the probability that it is telling the truth. 
Such an argument is possible with rhetoric but not with 
dialectic. 
To achieve this ability to use probabilities, an 
artificially intelligent machine must not be restricted 
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to formal logic but be able to operate through informal 
procedures. What I mean by "informal" is that the 
machine needs to work within the spectrum between the 
absolutes instead of operating in terms of absolute (1) 
and (0). 
Fortunately, we already have an example of an 
informal system generating intelligent activity, the 
human brain. Neurons operate by using this spectrum 
between the absolutes when they are excited to produce 
brain activities. When a neuron is stimulated and 
emits a signal, the signal's strength diminishes as it 
spreads through the dendritic trees that lead to other 
neurons (Stillings et al. 1987). So the brain, unlike 
the computer, does not act in a binary fashion because 
signals aren't used in ON (1) I OFF (0) ways. Rather, 
the entire spectrum between ON and OFF is used, due to 
the varying gradients of stimulus received and emitted 
by neurons. 
Therefore, by recognizing that probabilities, not 
absolutes, are the basis of reasoning and discourse, we 
need to develop machines that operate informally within 
the spectrum between truth and falseness. 
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Categories, Frames, and Scripts 
Aristotle believed that discourse could be divided 
into categories that were grouped according to 
similarities of features or purpose (1385b6). 
Logically, through heuristics of argument, one could 
use these categories to prove an argument through 
rational proof. But in his Rhetoric (from I Chapter 3 
through II Chapter 17) he became convinced that 
rhetoric limited to rational proof did not describe 
oratory as it was practiced (Kennedy 1980). Rather, he 
recognized that contextual social issues would evoke 
responses from the audience due to associated matters 
outside the categories. For example, in law cases 
where pain was involved, a sense of pity would be 
naturally evoked from the jury. Often the human 
associations made between concepts like pain and pity 
played a large part in the jury's decision about what 
was probably true (1385b12). Depending on the hearers' 
experiences with something like pain, the sense of pity 
would be stronger or weaker. 
In artificial intelligence, Minsky's concept of 
frames and Schank's concept of scripts is somewhat 
equivalent to categories and heuristics respectively. 
In a formal system like a computer, as in dialectic, 
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the boundaries of the frames and scripts are strictly 
defined. As Minsky (1986) and Schank (1975, 1986) 
point out, psychologists have found that the human 
brain tends to work in linear schemas like scripts, 
grouping information into categories like frames. But 
something they neglect to notice is that these schemas 
and categories are not formally defined systems as 
computers require. Rather, humans have the ability to 
make informal, non-linear associations between 
seemingly unrelated members of different categories 
depending on an individual's experiences. These 
informal "associative connections" seem to operate 
through a parallel network that is outside of the 
working schemas (Stillings et al. 1987). 
Through the car example of two sections ago, we can 
see how these meaning associations affect the use of 
natural language. For two people, Bob and Susan, the 
concepts of "car" and "truck" tend to exist in the same 
category which we will label "vehicle." For both of 
them, the concepts of "car" and "mountain" would 
probably fall into separate categories. But for Bob, 
who faithfully drives to the mountains in Colorado to 
ski at least once a year, the concepts of "car" and 
"mountain" are more strongly associated in his mind 
than in Susan's, who has never driven to the mountains. 
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Despite their different strengths of connection between 
"car" and "mountain," though, for both Bob and Susan 
the concept of "truck" probably still makes very little 
association with that of "mountain." 
Psychologists have shown through timed experiments 
that these associations between categories are direct 
and don't require a linear trace to connect the 
categories. So the process isn't one in which an 
entire frame is called up to connect two members of 
different categories; rather the connection is made 
through parallel meaning associations between 
individual concepts from different categories 
(Stillings et al. 1987). These associations complement 
linear schemas (such as Schank's restaurant script) 
without forcing an access to an entire category. 
As Minsky and Schank have shown, computers can 
operate linearly though formalized frames and scripts, 
but these meaning associations (which Aristotle found 
to be very important to successful discourse) are 
unavailable due to the formal hardware of computers. 
First, the brain, through its informal structure, 
can access bits of associated meanings directly without 
working back linearly through category trees. 
Second, attempting to elude the problem by making 
sub-categories for each meaning association ("marking" 
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as Schank (1986) proposes) the computational needs 
mushroom out of reason. 
Third, the binary processes of computers don't 
allow them to access categories in gradients depending 
on contextual relevance. To explain, computers can 
either access (1) or not access (0) a category, causing 
all associations to be accessed equally. In humans, 
associations gain strength depending on contextual 
relevance. Obviously, the impulse from the "mountain" 
category will be much stronger when Bob is driving 
through the mountains than when he is driving to work 
in Iowa. 
Finally, the meaning associations need to be 
parallel so they can be accessible while linear scripts 
are being used. 
Through consideration of these parallel meaning 
associations, we find that an informal machine that 
doesn't rely on formal structure is needed to achieve 
artificial intelligence. The categories can't be 
formally defined because information needs to be 
accessed in gradients depending on ideosyncratic 
relevance to a context. For this reason, parallel 
meaning association networks are essential to 
compliment the linear abilities of an artificially 
intelligent machine. 
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Enthymeme and Example, Non-monotonic Reasoning and 
Intentionality 
The ability to make informal associations outside 
of the categories, as Aristotle recognized, is 
important for effective persuasion, but isn't available 
to formal syllogism (dialectic deduction). Ideally, 
syllogisms are built on indisputable rational proof. 
In social situations, however, argument never blindly 
follows syllogistic heuristics to derive conclusions; 
rather, arguers know their desired conclusion and try 
to find the "means of persuasion" through rhetoric to 
bring themselves or an audience to that conclusion 
(1355b26). As in a courtroom, the speaker starts with 
a desired conclusion ("I am innocent"), then finds the 
proof and associations to persuade the jury that the 
desired conclusion is probably true. 
In artificial intelligence we find a similar case 
in the research into non-monotonic reasoning and 
intentionality. Non-monotonic reasoning is when humans 
go beyond strict linear patterns and "draw conclusions 
based on incomplete information, but these conclusions 
are open to revision as better information becomes 
available" (Nute 1984). Intensionality is the ability 
to set a desired goal that guides the direction of 
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behavior. Many artificial intelligence researchers 
have seen these qualities as requiring induction. 
However, by definition, induction cannot be built on 
deduction, leaving the binary framework of computers 
without inductive abilities. Nute (1984) and Rankin 
(1988) reinforced this situation: 
Since Nute's conception of formal systems will 
validate even monotonic inference as being 
deductively validated, as we have seen, it follows 
that formal systems in which non-monotonic 
inferences are acceptable must be non-deductive 
systems, necessarily (Rankin 1988). 
Aristotle had discovered the same problem with 
dialectic, causing him to define rhetorical discourse 
in terms of two informal branches, enthymeme and 
example: 
I call the enthymeme a rhetorical syllogism, and 
the example a rhetorical induction. Everyone who 
effects persuasion through proof does in fact use 
either enthymeme or examples; there is no other 
way ( 1356b4). 
A major difference between the dialectical and 
rhetorical versions of these argument patterns is that 
deduction and induction are formal procedures in which 
one follows heuristics to arrive at a true conclusion. 
Enthymeme and example are informal procedures in which 
one starts with a desired conclusion and improves the 
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probability of it being true through rational proof and 
associations. 
As Rankin and Nute have pointed out, a restriction 
to syllogisms as in computer hardware makes the 
important qualities of non-monotonic reasoning and 
intentionality inaccessable to formally deductive 
machines. Rather, intelligence requires the informal 
qualities of reasoning evidenced by enthymeme and 
example in rhetoric. Furthering this point, Rankin 
(1988) concludes that non-monotonic reasoning '"appears 
to be one of direct parallelism'" in which strictly 
linear processes won't allow a machine to come to a 
solid conclusion without a substantial base of 
information. 
Unlike computers, human minds have the pragmatic 
ability, as we've discussed, to act through parallel 
and linear processes simultaneously. Psychologists 
have known since the middle of the century that neurons 
tend to work in 'Parallel groupings or '"societies'" in 
which patterns of information are stored amongst a 
group of neurons responsible for them (Hebb 1949, 
Minsky 1986). So when a concept (like '"car") is 
experienced, the neuron group responsible for that 
pattern is excited. Likewise, the parallel 
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associations (such as "mountain") are activated 
gradiently depending on their contextual relevance. 
Therefore, based on the stimulated patterns set by 
previous experiences, the neuron groups would be able 
to determine a likely conclusion based on the scripts 
stored from similar situations. But these are not 
formal conclusions: the perceived conclusion depends 
on the combination of inputs from both linear patterns 
from the past and various ideosyncratic meaning 
associations with the categories involved (Stillings 
et al. 1989). So like an enthymeme, an expected 
conclusion is available though the information set is 
incomplete. 
Here is an example to clear this concept up. Bob 
is now driving his car to the mountains through 
Nebraska. The neuron grouping in which the category of 
trips is stored sets the general script to lead to the 
destination (conclusion). With his conclusion set, he 
might look at the map or pull from memory the means of 
arriving at his destination. In addition to these 
linear procedures, Bob's actions are also influenced by 
ideosyncratic meaning associations. To Bob, the 
flatness of Nebraska associates with boredom, and the 
boredom associates with an urge to drive faster. These 
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scripts and associations all work together to lead him 
to his conclusion. 
Now let's move ahead in the script. Bob made it to 
the mountains and is driving to his favorite ski 
resort. Due to the context, his meaning associations 
change his behavior. Bob associates driving in the 
mountains with a sense of fear. Though not a strong 
impulse, it does cause him to slow down a bit. 
This very crude example shows on a macro-level how 
the brain informally uses linear patterns with parallel 
meaning associations to achieve non-monotonic 
reasoning. By interelating informal scripts with 
associations, the human mind can anticipate conclusions 
based on the overall stimulations of patterns 
previously stored within neuron groups. This informal 
process also alleviates the problem of intentionality. 
When a direct pattern cannot be identified, distantly 
similar patterns and parallel meaning associations can 
combine to provide a possible conclusion subject to 
alteration. 
However, this type of reasoning, as Rankin pointed 
out, is not available to formal, deductive computers 
whose hardware restricts them to formal linear 
processes. To accomplish non-monotonic reasoning and 
intentionality an artificially intelligent machine 
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needs to be informal, parallel, and able to 
pre-determine a conclusion (which is open to change 
depending on context) through a combination of stimuli 
from neuron groups. In other words, artificially 
intelligent machines need to use informal procedures 
similar to rhetoric's use of enthymeme and example. 
Self-Organization and the ··Knack" 
And finally, one last connection. In Plato's 
Gorgias, Socrates argues that proper skill in rhetoric 
is not teachable; rather a student gains a "knack" for 
rhetorical skill through practice and exposure to 
proper ethics. Socrates compares rhetoric to cookery 
in that only practice and knowledge of what is good 
leads to success. One just can't be taught the proper 
procedures and do the task as well as an expert. One 
must develop the "knack" (462-463). 
With computers, the focus is on programming. A 
programmer like Schank observes an activity and 
formalizes that activity into a script that prescribes 
how the computer will act given a certain set of 
conditions. Therefore, the programmer is responsible 
for setting the pattern of the activity. And yet, as 
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we know, often times even experts can't synthesize the 
exact reasoning behind their approaches to problems. 
Reisbeck and Schank have developed a program JUDGE 
for determining sentences for convicts that highlights 
the problems with programming behavior (Riesbeck and 
Schank 1989). The program takes into consideration the 
crime, severity of crime, remorse shown, among other 
linear considerations usually used by judges to make 
sentencing choices. Looking over a case and extracting 
the information set needed to make a sentencing 
decision, JUDGE considers similar cases from the past 
and the punishments delivered, then calculates through 
heuristics to determine a suitable punishment for the 
present case. 
In reality, though, judges' responsibilities of 
assigning punishments in cases cannot be handled 
through simple linear procedures. Over their years of 
service, experienced judges develop their skills of 
determining fair punishment through working within the 
social groups within the legal system and certainly 
bring more to decisions than a formal heuristic. 
Rather, their social environments have developed and 
reinforced patterns in their minds. The decisions made 
reflect a whole combination of schemas that they have 
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found successful and a multitude of meaning 
associations that social experiences have taught them. 
This concept of self-patterned experience was what 
Socrates probably meant with his identification of 
rhetoric with a "knack." A human mind isn't programmed 
with the proper scripts; society and reality develop 
and reinforce general patterns that the human mind 
follows. Therefore, like humans, artificially 
intelligent machines need to be able to discern 
patterns prevalent in their natural and social 
environments and develop their own reasoning abilities. 
Rosenblatt and his collegues refered to this quality as 
"self-organization" (Rosenblatt 1962). In terms of 
natural language, instead of formalizing language into 
parsing schemes, the machines need the ability to 
identify patterns in natural language on their own. As 
far as reasoning and discourse, the machine needs to be 
able to self-organize reasoning patterns based on what 
works in society and nature. 
Our jobs as researchers is to first build such 
machines and expose them to reality and society. Of 
course as any intelligent entity would, they'll make 
wrong associations and follow incorrect schemas, but 
nature and society will always be there to right them 
with a more successful pattern. To avoid the problems 
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of behaviorism, when they make an association or use a 
script that we cannot correct with a better pattern, we 
would need to alter the machines' wiring to make those 
patterns less accessible. As in the human brain, 
physical influences can lead certain concepts to be 
stored in general categories with a restricted ability 
to associate with other categories. 
Conclusion 
In this section, we've discussed what the parallels 
from rhetoric tell us about what type of machine could 
accomplish pragmatic natural language usage in 
artificial intelligence. By far this discussion isn't 
exhaustive and many other parallels from rhetoric 
certainly exist. But even this limited discussion of a 
few points shows how rhetoric and other established 
fields can serve as mentors to research in artificial 
intelligence. All that's required is for artificial 
intelligence to open its research to many of the issues 
that have already been addressed in other disciplines. 
We've found several points about what a computer can't 
do; but in addition, as is proper, we've also found a 
few properties that a machine would need to achieve 
artificial intelligence. 
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AT THE BRANCHPOINT, LOOKING TO THE FUTURE 
This work is concerned with the pragmatic aspects 
of natural language as they relate to research in 
artificial intelligence. In theoretical works such as 
this one, to write a conclusion and imagine that this 
discussion has resolved anything would be improper. If 
anything, this work is meant to provoke new questions 
while building a bridge through which new avenues of 
research can be pursued. 
In the discipline of artificial intelligence, the 
traditional paradigm that specifies the need for 
computers is breaking down somewhat. In 1986, 
Rumelhart and McClelland through their text Parall~l 
Distributed Processing offered a partial revival of 
connectionism through the building of more advanced 
neural networks. In their networks, unlike 
Rosenblatt's, specialized expert systems are connected 
in parallel to aet in societies when stimulus is 
received that they were programmed to recognize. Some 
researchers have held up parallel distributed 
processing as the approach of the future for artificial 
intelligence. Personally, I see it as just a step in 
the right direction. There is still that desire in 
parallel distributed processing to return to 
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rationalism and program what the neurons are supposed 
to do under certain situations. 
Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus (1988) wrote that with 
the problems of heuristic branch and the revival of the 
connectionist branch, artificial intelligence finds 
itself "back at a branchpoint." But have we really 
stepped back with thirty years of wasted work? Not 
really. We now are approaching the discipline with a 
wider view of the problems that need to be overcome in 
artificial intelligence. The path certainly has been 
and will continue to be harder than most of the first 
artificial intelligence researchers probably realized. 
But to imply that we haven't gone anywhere since the 
1950s is incorrect. 
I prefer to see artificial intelligence as looking 
to the future. Probably due to its own inflated 
claims, people expect too much from artificial 
intelligence when in reality the discipline is still 
only starting. An infant when compared to other 
disciplines, artificial intelligence is still just 
feeling its boundaries. As in any other discipline, 
wrong paths have been followed but not without advances 
in understanding. 
The humanities definitely have an important role to 
play in the future of artificial intelligence. As 
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disciplines concerned with what constitutes human 
behavior, the humanities can offer guidance toward the 
qualities of humanness that artificial intelligence 
wants its machines to possess. Artificial intelligence 
as a discipline needs to recognize the importance of 
the humanities to its work. Otherwise, it will 
stagnate--continually falling into the traps that the 
humanities have already stepped over. 
This work was meant to provide a bridge between the 
disciplines in the hope that more bridges will follow. 
A great amount of research, work, and understanding 
still needs to be done. 
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